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Foreword
Professor Bryan Edwards
Of all the challenges facing the UK today, few are as demanding as those 
arising in the defence, security and resilience domain. Some are modern 
variants of those faced for many years. Others are entirely new and are 
characteristically different to anything that has preceded them. Others again 
have yet to emerge but no doubt will, given the UK’s position in a rapidly 
evolving world. 
One unifying feature of this large and complex array of challenges is that 
few, if any, lend themselves to a single discipline solution and the interaction 
between scientific and other considerations is self-evident when considering 
opportunities for effective, ethically acceptable and cost-effective measures. 
With that in mind, the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) is 
delighted to fund and actively participate in this series of conferences as 
part of its Defence, Security and Resilience Futures Programme. This aims to 
identify and facilitate the engagement of the relevant capabilities of the UK 
National Laboratories, industry and university research groups with some 
of the most demanding and highest priority challenges in national security 
in the widest sense (including the disruption of services upon which normal 
functioning of society is dependent).
Each conference addresses a topical issue within the domain and brings 
together academics, industrialists and those in government with an interest 
in or responsibility for aspects of the topic, aiming to explore the interface 
between academic research and policy, and where the former might 
contribute to development or refinement of the latter.
I therefore make no apology for this meeting adopting a strategic perspective 
on the issue, nor the unusually diverse spectrum of experience and expertise 
present at the meetings. Both are necessary to meet our aims of exploring 
the potential for step change rather than incremental development, and to 
understand and identify corresponding areas of uncertainty. Such areas can 
be addressed by focused academic research and by posing questions which, 
if answered, will enable policy and decision makers to either do things 
significantly differently or to do significantly different things. 
Thanks must go to RUSI for all their extremely hard work organising and 
delivering this event. However, the final word of thanks is reserved for all 
those who participated so enthusiastically on the day, whether as speakers 
or delegates. 
vi Foreword
This document will serve as an enduring record of those contributions. More 
than that, I hope it will encourage academics in all disciplines to consider how 
their particular expertise might contribute to, in this case, coping with the 
emergence and spread of infectious diseases that are increasingly resistant 
to currently available therapeutic agents.
Finally, anyone wishing to know more about the conference programme, 
STFC’s interest in defence, security and resilience or working more with STFC 
in this domain is invited to contact me using the e-mail address below. 
Professor Bryan Edwards
Science and Technology Facilities Council
bryan.edwards@stfc.ac.uk
Introduction: Addressing the Threat from 
Antimicrobial Resistance
Jennifer Cole
The Resilience and Emergency Management programme at RUSI focuses on 
the threats and hazards on the UK’s National Risk Register, and researches 
the capabilities we need to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from 
these threats. In addressing antimicrobial resistance, RUSI has also focused 
on an emerging risk which, while not currently on the National Risk Register, 
poses an increasingly serious threat to the UK and its interests. Identifying 
and tackling such risks early is a vital component of resilience. The earlier 
such threats can be addressed, the more easily they can be planned for, 
responded to and recovered from; in short, the more resilient to them we 
will become.
In the past few months, political interest in antimicrobial resistance has 
reached an important tipping point. AMR has long touched the edges of a 
number of defence and security issues1 including immigration policy (where 
preventing the spread of drug-resistant tuberculosis, gonorrhoea and 
other diseases into and around the UK is a challenge), the management of 
refugee camps (in which more than 90 per cent of the cases of dysentery 
can be resistant to the two most common front-line drugs) and the response 
to pandemic flu (which would become even more serious if the flu strain 
involved was drug-resistant).2 Now, however, AMR is being considered in 
its own right; the Department of Health has considered how AMR affects 
existing National Risk Assessment emergency scenarios and has agreed to 
consider how it affects UK National security interests more widely for the next 
National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) in 2014. The NSRA is summarised 
in the UK’s National Security Strategy and this, in turn, informs the National 
Risk Register.
Moving AMR up the Political Agenda
Such attention is long overdue. At the time of the 9/11 attacks on the USA, 
in which just under 3,000 people lost their lives, more than 6,000 Americans 
died every year from MRSA caught in hospitals,3 yet the issue received 
1 J Cole, ‘Antimicrobial resistance and healthcare resilience: a game changer for the 21st 
century?’, RUSI.org, 23 August 2013.
2 J Cole, ‘Antimicrobial resistance, infection control and planning for pandemics: The 
importance of knowledge transfer in healthcare resilience and emergency planning’, 
Journal of Business Continuity and Emergency Planning (Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 
2012–2013) pp 122–23, <http://www.henrystewartpublications.com/jbcep/v6>.
3 E Klein, D L Smith and R Laxminarayan, ‘Hospitalisations and Deaths Caused by 
Methicillin–Resistant Staphyloccocus aureus, United States, 1999–2005’, Emerging 
Infectious Diseases (Vol. 13, No. 12, December 2007), Centers for Disease Control and 
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little interest outside of specialist medical circles. It would be more than a 
decade before the 2011 World Health Day was dedicated to AMR and the 
topic began to push its way slowly up the political agenda. We need to move 
faster. As the World Economic Forum Report 2013 recognises: ‘We will never 
stay ahead of the [AMR] mutation curve. A test of our resilience is how far 
behind it we allow ourselves to fall.’4
Policy and academia both tend to move slowly, while at grassroots level, 
front-line healthcare providers in hospitals and GP surgeries face a threat 
from AMR that is growing every day. It is essential that early adopters and 
champions of better antibiotic stewardship are identified; that barriers to 
the development of novel therapeutics, alternative treatments and the 
implementation of existing policy are removed; and that the importance of 
AMR to all sectors of society, not just to health, is communicated widely and 
effectively.
Internationally, initiatives such as European Antibiotics Awareness Day, held 
annually on 18 November, and the findings of the Transatlantic Task Force 
on Antimicrobial Resistance – which suggests that 50 per cent of antibiotic 
prescribing is ‘inappropriate or unnecessary’5 – are pushing the message out 
across multiple sectors. In the UK, the NHS and Department of Health are 
addressing the issue through programmes that encourage better antibiotic 
prescribing, such as ‘Start smart – then focus’ (covered in Chapter IV of 
this report); the National Institute of Clinical Excellence’s Guideline 1496 on 
reducing antibiotics in neonatal care (where the percentage of antibiotics 
administered needlessly is estimated to be between 90 and 99 per cent; 
see Chapter V); and the forthcoming UK Five Year Antimicrobial Resistance 
Strategy and Action Plan 2013–2018. 
Policy only has impact if it is successfully implemented, however, and 
implementation often relies on robust, evidence-based research that 
provides support for best practice, encourages changes in behaviour and 
helps turn good intentions into common use.
Preventions (CDC), Atlanta GA, USA <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/> last accessed 26 
June 2013.
4 See <http://reports.weforum.org/global–risks–2013/view/risk–case–1/the–dangers–
of–hubris–on–human–health/> last accessed 17 May 2013.
5 See <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/TATFAR/
Documents/210911_TATFAR_Report.pdf> last accessed 6 August 2012.
6 ‘Antibiotics for early–onset neonatal infection: antibiotics for the prevention and 
treatment of early–onset neonatal infection’, see <http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG/
Wave23/7>.
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RUSI’s Ongoing Research into Tackling AMR
The aim of the conference held at RUSI on 6 February 2013, funded by the 
Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC), was to identify research 
topics that will help to enable and implement existing UK government policy 
on antimicrobial resistance, which in turn will shape and inform future policy. 
Morning presentation panels and afternoon discussion forums explained 
the main challenges, framed the problems and sought to suggest solutions, 
drawing up a list of research areas and topics the STFC might choose to fund. 
The results of this conference will be distributed not only through RUSI and 
the STFC, but also to the other UK funding councils, key UK Government 
stakeholders, UK universities and research and development organisations 
including DSTL, the National Institute for Health Research and the Home 
Office Scientific Development Branch, so that they too may chose to add 
some of the topics discussed here to their future funding calls.
Addressing AMR needs a cross-governmental, cross-sector and cross-
disciplinary approach. Representatives from the World Health Organization, 
the Department of Health, the National Health Service, the Health Protection 
Agency, the Ministry of Defence, the Society for General Microbiology and 
the Chief Medical Officer, Dame Sally Davies, participated in the conference. 
More than sixty delegates came from a wide range of backgrounds to find 
solutions together.
RUSI is extremely grateful to the STFC for providing the funding to make this 
conference possible, to the Department of Health and the Health Protection 
Agency (now Public Health England) for their support and guidance on the 
content of the discussions, and to all the speakers, discussion session chairs 
and rapporteurs. RUSI will continue to highlight the security and resilience 
implications of AMR over the coming months.
Jennifer Cole is Senior Research Fellow, Resilience and Emergency Management 
at the Royal United Services Institute. Her research programme includes 
CBRN prevention, response and recovery; infectious disease outbreaks 
caused by naturally occurring pandemics and bioterrorism; and strategies for 
warning and informing the public. Her academic background is in biological 
anthropology, and she is currently a Reid Scholar in Health, the Human Body 
and Behaviour at Royal Holloway, University of London.

The Threat from AMR: Global and 
National Perspectives

I. The UK Five-Year AMR Strategy and Action Plan 
Professor Dame Sally Davies
Antibiotics are essential for the treatment of infections in humans and 
animals, but these uses are seriously jeopardised by the emergence 
and spread of multi-resistant bacteria and the lack of new antibiotics. As 
increasing international trade and travel favours the spread of antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR) between countries, AMR is a global public health concern 
with action required at both national and international level. 
There are few public health threats of greater importance than AMR in terms 
of impact for society. The harsh reality is that we are at increasing risk of 
developing infections that cannot be treated. The rapid spread of multi-drug 
resistant bacteria means that we could be close to reaching a point where 
everyday infections will become untreatable. European data1 suggest that 
the thirty-day mortality of patients with multi-resistant E coli blood stream 
infections is double that of patients with infections caused by susceptible 
strains. A multi-pronged holistic approach is needed if we are to limit the risk 
of AMR, conserve existing antibiotics and ensure they are used optimally, as 
well as facilitate the development of new diagnostics and treatments.
Background
AMR has been recognised at national, European and global level for a long 
time. The use of antibiotics increases the selective pressure for resistance. 
Resistance can be managed but not eradicated. Interest in AMR has increased 
recently due to the rapid spread of multi-resistant bacteria and the lack of 
new antibiotics. The last two years have seen the agreement of the WHO 
Regional Office for Europe’s European strategic action plan on antibiotic 
resistance,2 the EU Strategic Action Plan3 and EU Council Conclusions4 on a 
‘one health’ approach.
1 Kraker, M E A, et al, ‘Burden of antimicrobial resistance in European hospitals: 
excess mortality and length of stay associated with bloodstream infections due to 
Escherichia coli resistant to third generation cephalosporins’, Journal of Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy (Vol. 66, No. 3, November 2010) pp. 398–407, see <http://jac.
oxfordjournals.org/content/66/2/398.full>, last accessed 18 May 2013.
2 European strategic action plan on antibiotic resistance, 10 June 2011, see <www.
euro.who.int/en/who–we–are/governance/regional–committee–for–europe/past–
sessions/sixty–first–session/documentation/working–documents/wd14–european–
strategic–action–plan–on–antibiotic–resistance>.
3 European strategic action plan on antibiotic resistance 2011–2016, see <https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/european–strategic–action–plan–on–antibiotic–
resistance–published>.
4 Council conclusions on the impact of antimicrobial resistance in the human health 
sector and in the veterinary sector – a ‘One Health’ perspective, Luxembourg, 22 June 
2012, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
lsa/131126.pdf>.
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My own understanding of the threat and risk of antimicrobial resistance 
increased as I prepared Volume Two of my annual report, which focuses on 
infection.5 As a result of this work I called for antimicrobial resistance to be 
included on the Risk Registers of both the Department of Health and the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
Multi-drug Resistant Bacteria
This increased activity has been prompted by the rapid and dramatic 
spread of multi-resistant bacteria. The resistance of Escherichia coli to 
third-generation cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides 
has increased significantly in more than half of the countries in Europe. 
Gonorrhoea is becoming increasingly resistant to antibiotic treatment and 
may become completely untreatable in the UK in future. 
In the UK, the rise in absolute numbers and resistance patterns of Gram-
negative bacteria (particularly members of the enterobacteriaceae family) 
is increasing rapidly, most notably from pathogens exhibiting extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) or carbapenemase producing abilities. Public 
Health England estimates that currently, E coli accounts for approximately 10 
per cent of all carbapenemase producers in UK isolates. 
The rapid spread in humans of carbapenemase-producing bacteria that 
are resistant to the broad-spectrum carbapenem antibiotics, which are 
normally used as the last line of treatment in human infections, highlights 
the seriousness of the issue. 
Threats exist from both domestic prescribing practices that fuel resistance, 
and resistant bacteria imported to the UK from infections acquired overseas. 
The recent emergence and rapid global spread of the New Delhi metallo-
beta-lactamase 1 (NDM-1) resistance in certain bacteria is a reminder that 
resistance will continue to evolve and has the capacity to significantly limit 
our ability to treat infections in humans and animals. However the risks from 
imported infections are not totally outside of our control. What we need to 
do is monitor the threats and take appropriate action to detect and contain 
infections when they occur.
The Lack of New Drugs
Resistance to an antimicrobial is not a problem if there are others to take 
its place. However, there are a finite number of antibiotics and very few in 
the research pipeline. Large pharmaceutical companies are not investing 
in antibiotic research because there is insufficient return on investment, 
compared with drugs for other conditions.
5 Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer: Volume Two, Department of Health, 11 
March 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chief–medical–officer–
annual–report–volume–2>.
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Given that the conventional pharmaceutical R&D model has not ensured a 
steady pipeline of new antimicrobials, there is urgent need for action at a 
global level to facilitate their development. We need to review the business 
model for development of antimicrobials, and show leadership through 
the strengthening of international partnerships and coalitions, such as the 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)6 with Europe. 
Previously we relied on the introduction of new antibiotics to deal with the 
development of resistance but the dearth of new drugs, especially for Gram-
negative organisms such as E coli means that we need to supplement this 
with new and alternative approaches to help mitigate this risk and conserve 
these valuable medical resources. The need for collective action to ensure 
antibiotics are used wisely and sparingly has never been more important 
than now. There is a key role for professionals to promote good practice 
across human and animal health. 
Given our limited understanding of the development of AMR, a greater 
emphasis will need to be given to research and surveillance activities in 
addition to the development of effective new antimicrobials and diagnostics. 
The Medical Research Council (MRC), the National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR), UK Clinical Research Collaboration (UKCRC), Defra and 
others fund research relevant to AMR and the strategy will improve co-
ordination between these players. 
Given the scale of global travel, it is inevitable that, sporadically, new 
infections will occur in the UK. What has to happen is a change of practice to 
ensure that information on travel and hospitalisation abroad is captured on 
admission to the UK and/or to the NHS. Screening, isolation and enhanced 
infection control measures need to be introduced as appropriate to reduce 
transmission. This will require significantly increased awareness and 
improved practice by both clinicians and managers. 
Antimicrobial use in both primary and secondary human healthcare has 
a large impact on the development of resistance and responsible use is 
needed in all sectors, as they are interconnected. Infections do transfer from 
the community to hospital as well as the other way. To date, most activity 
has focused on secondary care, but this will need to change to involve all 
healthcare sectors.
A significant amount of work has been carried out in the UK to improve 
surveillance, infection control and responsible prescribing but more action 
is needed at a national and global level to accelerate progress on this crucial 
public health issue. The risk from both domestic selective pressure and 
imported infections means that we must continue to work with international 
6 See <http://www.imi.europa.eu/>, last accessed 18 May 2013.
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colleagues and share information on emerging issues. Given the impetus 
for action, the new UK cross-government AMR Strategy and Action Plan 
(forthcoming) recognises the global nature of the issue and the need for 
more action at an international level. 
The Strategy
The Department of Health has led work to develop a new UK integrated five-
year AMR strategy and action plan in collaboration with Defra, the devolved 
administrations and other government departments. 
The strategy identifies seven key areas of activity:
1. Promoting responsible prescribing and effective administration 
of antimicrobials to preserve the activity of existing therapies and 
optimise prescribing practice
2. Improving infection prevention and control in human and animal 
systems
3. Raising awareness of the problem posed by antimicrobial resistance, 
improve public and professional knowledge and promoting change in 
behaviour in order to slow the development of resistance
4. Improving the evidence base through research to inform understanding 
of microbial pathogenesis resistance, alternatives to new drugs and 
new or improved diagnostic tests for humans and animals
5. Facilitating and encouraging the development of new drugs, vaccines 
and other immunotherapeutics
6. Improving the evidence base by strengthening surveillance, 
epidemiological data, and data linkage arrangements to unlock 
better-quality healthcare data and improve accessibility of the data
7. Strengthening UK and international collaboration, data and technology 
sharing across animal and human health fields to tackle this issue at 
a global level.
The Antimicrobial Resistance Action Plan in the strategy identifies key 
UK-wide initiatives and will be monitored in the annual report. Delivery of 
the strategy will be overseen by a UK cross-government steering group led 
by the Department of Health.
Strategic Outcome Measures
AMR is a complex issue requiring action on a number of fronts and we are 
keen to ensure that the strategy is challenging and accelerates progress. We 
have set five strategic national outcome measures. These cover both human 
and animal aspects and will be used to monitor progress to inform the annual 
report each November.
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One of the outcome measures of particular interest here is: ‘To establish 
robust mechanisms for data collection to monitor trends in key human “drug/
bug” combinations identified to successfully control and contain resistance.’
We will focus our efforts on key resistances to help establish trends. The 
drug/bug combinations that will be monitored in the first instance are shown 
in Table 1.
Table 1: Bug and Drug Combinations
Bug Drug Notes
Klebsiella carbapenem non-susceptible to imipenem and/or 
meropenem
E coli carbapenem non-susceptible to ertapenem, meropenem 
and/or imipenem
E coli cephalosporin non-susceptible to cefotaxime and/or 
ceftazidime
E coli fluoroquinolone non-susceptible to ciprofloxacin
Pseudomonas carbapenem non-susceptible to imipenem and/or 
meropenem
N gonorrhoeae ceftriaxone non-susceptible
Klebsiella cephalosporin non-susceptible to cefotaxime and/or 
ceftazidime
Pseudomonas cephalosporin non-susceptible to ceftazidime
E coli gentamicin non-susceptible
S pneumoniae penicillin non-susceptible
What we want to do is create a cultural movement at a societal level, similar 
to what happened for climate change where there is now societal awareness 
of the issue and acceptance that this a complex challenge requiring action on 
a large number of fronts by professionals, industry and the wider population 
to contain the problem. We will be calling on professional bodies and their 
members to do their bit to show clinical leadership to change behaviour and 
improve practice. 
Summary
The Strategy and Action Plan has been developed with consideration of what 
is affordable and achievable within the five-year term. It lays a foundation 
for more aspirational measures, which will involve infrastructure changes to 
facilitate the delivery of longer-term objectives. 
Containing AMR and preventing untreatable illness and premature mortality 
is a priority given the rapid spread of multi-resistant bacteria and the lack of 
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new antibiotics. These drivers have given new impetus to our work to tackle 
AMR and the new strategy will move us forward. Promoting responsible 
antibiotic prescribing is crucial, but work to encourage the development of 
new antibiotics is also urgently needed.
Its success depends on active support and commitment and I hope you will 
become AMR champions. We all have a vested interest in preserving the 
efficacy of antibiotics so that we, and future generations, have the benefit 
of antibiotics. I am personally championing the need to tackle antimicrobial 
resistance through my annual report, my activities and my discussions at 
every level: at the local level, in the Department of Health; at the national 
level, across government; and internationally through the World Health 
Organization.
Professor Dame Sally Davies is the Chief Medical Officer for England and 
is the Chief Scientific Advisor for the Department of Health. She has been 
actively involved in NHS research and development: as director-general she 
established the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) with a budget 
of £1 billion. She was awarded a DBE (Dame Commander of the British 
Empire) in the New Year Honours 2009 for services to medicine, and in 2011 
was conferred as Emeritus Professor at Imperial College London.
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II. Combating Antimicrobial Drug Resistance: The 
International Perspective
Dr Charles R Penn
Before penicillin, pneumonia and septicaemia killed nine out of ten of those 
who became infected. Since antibiotics and the introduction of penicillin, 
nine out of ten now live. However, the increasing incidence of resistance to 
the medicines, combined with very few new medicines in the pipeline will 
lead to rising mortality and rising healthcare costs in future.
This is not over-dramatising the problem. Take, for example, multi-resistant 
tuberculosis (see map on next page). Between 1994 and 2000, the proportion 
of multi-drug resistant TB cases was above 25 per cent in many countries 
and greater than 50 per cent in some.1 Other maps shows exactly the same 
pattern but in newly acquired cases – people getting tuberculosis for the 
first time and for whom treatments, in many cases, are no longer available. 
There are similar maps for malaria, HIV and other diseases. Some diseases, 
previously regarded as relatively easy to manage, are becoming untreatable, 
such as a highly resistant strain of gonorrhoea that is being extensively 
tracked and monitored worldwide.
The World Economic Forum, in its 2013 Global Risk Report, highlighted 
antimicrobial resistance. The global impact of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is 
apparent across the world: in some parts of Africa, antibiotic resistance is 
having a bigger impact than malaria and some other diseases more readily 
associated with those regions.
There is a wide range of examples of antibiotic-resistant bacteria occurring 
in places such as hospitals and the family home. One example is from a rural 
hospital in India where four neonatal deaths occurred, attributable to the 
New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase 1 (NDM-1) gene conferring resistance 
to a range of antibiotics. While a rural hospital in India might be seen as a 
relatively low resource setting, it is not an environment entirely lacking in 
modern health facilities and technology. 
The same thing is happening in much higher resource settings, in any case. 
Consider another paper published two to three years ago, on the death 
of two liver transplant patients in the USA.2 Carbapenemase-producing 
Klebsiella has already been mentioned, but here is an example of it having 
1 See Slide 5, available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Penn.pptx>.
2 R S Arnold et al, ‘Emergence of Klebsiella pneumonia Carbapenemase (KPC)–Producing 
Bacteria’, Southern Medical Journal (Vol. 104, No.1, January 2011), pp. 40–45. See 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3075864/>.
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a different kind of impact: the liver transplant patients both contracted 
carbapenemase-producing K. pneumonia and despite being treated with 
meropenem, subsequently died. There are many examples of this type.
Global Challenges
AMR is happening all over the world and has an impact on every aspect of 
health as well as other aspects of our lives. It is having an impact on infectious 
diseases such as pneumonia, gonorrhoea, tuberculosis, malaria and HIV, as 
well as on neonatal care, transplant surgery, cancer treatment and other 
forms of surgery. It is also having an impact on health security, travel, the 
deployment of people for humanitarian purposes or into conflict situations 
and on refugees. It potentially falls within the scope of International Health 
Regulations3 and better understanding is needed of how this subject will 
integrate with this international framework for managing health risks around 
the world in future. The challenge is looking at why the problem has occurred 
and why it is persisting. There is a lack of awareness and understanding 
of what is happening across the world, organism by organism, country by 
country. Some countries have developed or are developing good plans for 
tackling AMR at a national level, but many countries have not, and there is a 
need for greater international co-operation. 
For WHO, there are conflicting challenges. There is inappropriate use of 
antimicrobial medicines between human and animal health, and the more 
these medicines are used, the more they will be lost through resistance. On 
the other hand, many parts of the world do not have enough access to the 
antibiotics that do work, so improving equitable access is just as important. 
It is quite a complex challenge.
Lack of New Medicines
Every antibiotic has a finite fully useful life; resistance to anti-infective 
medicines will always arise due to natural selection.4 The challenge is how 
to best manage those finite lifespans, particularly when there have been 
relatively few recent introductions. At the moment, there are very few new 
drugs in the pipeline. 
In 2011, AMR was the topic of World Health Day. Six key actions were 
identified:
1. Develop comprehensive national plans that involve accountability 
and civil society engagement
3 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 2005, <http://www.who.
int/ihr/en>.
4 R Nugent, E Back, A Beith, The Race Against Drug Resistance, Center for Global 
Development, 2010, <http://www.cgdev.org/files/1424207_file_CGD_DRWG_FINAL.
pdf>.
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2. Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity
3. Improve access to essential medicines of assured quality. In some 
parts of the world, poor quality or counterfeit medicines is part of 
the problem
4. Rationalise use of medicines
5. Enhance infection prevention and control 
6. Foster innovation and research and development for new tools. 
Research Needs: Surveillance and Burden of Disease
Better information is needed on what is happening in the world, with better 
surveillance and tracking of antimicrobial infectious disease resistance. At the 
moment, there are many networks of surveillance systems. Some are global, 
looking at specific diseases, while many are at a national or subnational 
level. The global picture of what is happening is less clear: there needs to be 
a way of connecting the smaller snapshots to develop a single larger picture, 
and not just in microbiological terms. The health impact globally needs to 
be better understood – and also the economic impact. If people are to be 
persuaded to invest in solutions to the problem, the financial cost needs to 
be discussed. Evidence is needed to support policy changes and to be able to 
monitor the impact of those changes so that efforts to combat AMR can be 
reinforced or adjusted.
A stronger evidence base and better systematic reviews of the available 
evidence are needed to guide policies and plans to combat AMR. Some of the 
issues seem clear: agricultural use of antibiotics exceeds the use in human 
health, for example, and many countries are taking steps to limit their use 
in areas such as growth promotion and prophylaxis in livestock. The case for 
such intervention would be stronger with better evidence on the impact of 
antibiotic use in agriculture on human health on the one hand, and its role in 
agricultural economy and food security on the other. Even in human health 
we face similar challenges. An example of the paradox is illustrated by a 
recent clinical study published in the New England Journal of Medicine.5 The 
study looked at antibiotic use in malnourished children in Africa. The study 
showed a benefit to the use of antibiotics but the potential cost in terms of 
increased risk of antibiotic resistance was not assessed. Again, understanding 
how to get the balance right is key, and this depends on evidence. 
Ways of encouraging investment in new tools, not just the medicines, need 
to be found. New ways of thinking about return on investment and the 
business models for investment in research and development are needed. 
At the moment, the climate to encourage that innovation does not exist; 
5 I Trehan, H S Goldbach, L N LaGrone, G J Meuli, R J Wang, K M Maleta, M J Manary, 
‘Antibiotics as Part of Management of Severe Acute Malnutrition’, The New England 
Journal of Medicine (January 31, 2013). See <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/23363496>, last accessed 18 May 2013.
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however, there are research opportunities that go beyond biology – in the 
fields of economics and social sciences for example. 
Avoidable Mortality
AMR is not an issue that can be postponed. Deaths are occurring today – a 
factsheet published in May 2012 by ReAct,6 an independent global network for 
concerned action on antibiotic resistance, shows how in a range of organisms 
and diseases there is a higher mortality rate if the organism is resistant to 
antibiotics. There are also examples of where actions are having a positive 
effect, such as good regulation of animal use and prescribing practices in 
Australia, which has kept resistance to certain classes of antibiotics very low 
relative to other countries.
Another example is bedaquiline, the new treatment for tuberculosis, which 
was approved by the US FDA in December after only Phase II studies7 – the 
normal process for licensing a new pharmaceutical involves five phases. There 
was innovative thinking around approval because there are many people for 
whom there is no other choice. In another part of the world, Thailand has 
introduced a programme to educate patients and prescribers on appropriate 
use of antibiotics. 
It is a big challenge and there is much that still needs to be done but there 
are examples of where actions are having an effect. 
Charles R Penn TD PhD FRSPH joined the World Health Organization, Geneva 
at the start of the 2009 influenza pandemic, and was initially responsible 
for the use of antivirals in influenza management. He currently oversees 
programmes on antimicrobial resistance, infection prevention and control, 
hepatitis and respiratory viruses. He also chairs WHO’s Guidelines Review 
Committee, which monitors the quality of all of WHO’s health guidelines.
6 See http://www.reactgroup.org/uploads/publications/react–publications/ReAct–
facts–burden–of–antibiotic–resistance–May–2012.pdf, last accessed 30 May 2013.
7 G Kovacs, ‘Future Technologies for Pharmaceutical Resilience’, Pharmaceutical 
Resilience: Proceedings of the Workshop Pharmaceutical Resilience for Serious 
Infectious Disease, 5 February 2013, RUSI, 2013. See http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/201304_Pharmaceutical_Resilience_Web.pdf 
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III. National and International Spread of AMR: 
Clones and Genes
Professor Alan Johnson
The problem of antimicrobial resistance is immense; it crops up in a range of 
different pathogens. This paper will focus on three very common pathogens 
that are experienced in the UK and where resistance is seen: Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus and Escherichia coli. Many of the 
underlying principles of what is known about strain and gene spread are 
applicable to a whole range of other pathogens, some of which will be 
discussed later.
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Over recent decades it has become apparent that, in terms of the spread of 
resistance, there are a number of resistant lineages, or clones of the pathogen 
Streptococcus pneumoniae that are clearly capable of very widespread 
dissemination. One of the first strains to be characterised, designated 
Spain23F-1, is resistant to three antibiotics – namely penicillin, tetracycline 
and chloramphenicol. The story started to unfold in the late 1980s when 
there was an outbreak of pneumococcal infection and colonisation affecting 
children in a nursery in Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Local investigators decided 
to study what was happening and look at the dynamics of strain spread 
in the nursery but they actually made the unexpected finding that, when 
characterised at a molecular level, the individual isolates were identical to a 
multi-resistant strain that had been described in Spain some years previously. 
This was published in literature as the first documented example of strain 
spread between continents, and this particular strain has subsequently gone 
on to spread globally.
Lineages of resistant pneumococci are classified by a body called the 
Pneumococcal Molecular Epidemiology Network (PMEN) that uses DNA 
sequencing to characterise clinical isolates of pneumococci, particularly 
those that are resistant to antibiotics. Isolates characterised at the molecular 
level are then grouped into series of lineages, or clones, that are capable 
of widespread dissemination, based on their isolation from geographically 
diverse locations. It has identified around forty such clones to date. Each 
strain is assigned a categorisation on the basis of the country from which the 
first isolate was documented. The serotype is given as a superscript and then 
the strains are numbered sequentially.
These data are not just of academic interest, but apply to everyday clinical 
microbiology. Ten years ago, the Health Protection Agency (now Public Health 
England) collaborated with a district general hospital in Berkshire in a study 
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where the hospital microbiologists collected all of their invasive pneumococci 
over a fifteen-month period and sent them to the National Reference 
Laboratory for characterisation. There were fifty-six cases of pneumococcal 
bacteraemia over that time period, which shows it is an important pathogen. 
Around a third of those isolates were antibiotic-resistant. When all the 
isolates were characterised in the reference laboratory, all of the resistant 
ones identified were strains that had already been documented by the 
Pneumococcal Molecular Epidemiology Network. So these sorts of isolates 
are being seen in everyday clinical practice.
Pneumococci comprise about ninety different serotypes based on their 
capsular polysaccharide. The capsule coats the bacteria and serves as a 
virulence factor in that it prevents the organisms being phagocytosed by 
the polymorphonuclear leucocytes, or white blood cells. In layman’s terms, 
this means it is a mechanism for warding off the body’s nonspecific defence 
mechanisms and is important in virulence. It was shown many decades 
ago that if antisera was raised to the capsule polysaccharides and in vitro 
phagocytosis experiments were undertaken, the antisera would opsonise the 
bacteria – making it more susceptible to the action of phagocytes. Hence it 
became clear that an antibody response is likely to be a very potent immune 
mechanism for fighting pneumococcal disease. 
Using Vaccination
This led to the idea that it is possible to use vaccination to prevent 
pneumococcal infections. However, because there are ninety different 
serotypes of S pneumoniae, effective vaccines would need to be made up of 
multiple capsule antigens. Fortunately, the serotypes do not occur with equal 
frequency; some are common and others relatively rare. By undertaking 
surveillance to monitor the distribution of the different serotypes it is 
possible to choose which serotype antigens to include in the vaccine. 
Another problem is that because they are polysaccharide antigens, they 
are not immunogenic in very young children, who comprise one of the two 
major groups of patients where invasive pneumococcal disease is a particular 
problem, the other group being the elderly. To make the capsular antigens 
immunogenic so they can be used to effectively vaccinate children, the 
polysaccharides are chemically coupled to two protein carriers. In 2006, the 
7-valent vaccine (a vaccine made up of the seven commonest pneumococcal 
serotypes, all immunogenic for children) was introduced; this has recently 
been superseded by a new 13-valent conjugate vaccine.
A strong correlation between serotype and antimicrobial resistance has been 
identified and it is also known that a lot of the serotypes that are resistant 
were included in the vaccine. This led to speculation that if the vaccine was 
effective, not only would a drop in the incidence of invasive pneumococcal 
disease be seen, but so too would a drop in resistance. 
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The UK has been relatively fortunate in terms of penicillin resistance: over the 
last twenty years or so, the percentage levels of resistance in pneumococci 
have remained in single figures, which compares favourably with many other 
parts of the world where penicillin resistance rates can be 30 to 50 per cent 
or more. 
There has been a problem, however, with erythromycin resistance in 
pneumococci, which has typically been around 15 per cent of all isolates, 
with even higher rates being seen in isolates from children aged less than 
two. The higher rate of resistance in very young children is likely to relate to 
greater use of antibiotics in children. This highlights the issue of antimicrobial 
stewardship and whether so many antibiotics should be used in children, 
particularly for minor infections, because the more antibiotics are used, the 
greater the selective pressure and the higher the resistance rates tend to be.
What is known is that the erythromycin resistance is associated with serotype 
14, in particular the England14-9 lineage described by the Pneumococcal 
Molecular Epidemiology Network and referred to above. As the serotype 14 
antigen was included in the 7-valent vaccine, it was postulated that when the 
vaccine was introduced a decline in the proportion of pneumococci resistant 
to erythromycin would be seen. 
In a remarkably short period of time following the introduction of the vaccine 
in 2006, there was a phenomenal drop in the proportion of pneumococci 
from young children that were erythromycin-resistant, clearly showing how 
these sorts of surveillance activities can give rise to interventions that can be 
quite effective.
Staphylococcus aureus
The proportion of isolates of Staphylococcus aureus from blood culture that 
are methicillin-resistant, referred to as MRSA, has increased dramatically over 
time. Back in 1990, a patient with staphylococcal sepsis starting treatment 
with flucloxocillin would have had about a 98 to 99 per cent chance of being 
on the right drug. Throughout the 1990s however, there was year-on-year 
increase in methicillin resistance, such that by the turn of the century, the 
chance that a patient with staphylococcal sepsis would have had MRSA had 
risen to around 45 per cent.
This had a major impact on treatment: in the early 1990s, flucloxocillin would 
have been the drug of choice. Throughout the 1990s doctors increasingly 
had to turn to using glycopeptides, in particular vancomycin, for treatment. 
Although vancomycin works, it is not as good a drug as flucloxicillin, so 
patients were arguably receiving less robust treatment.
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Epidemic Strains
Two particular strains of MRSA (which are actually now known as EMRSA – 
the E standing for Epidemic) that emerged in the 1990s had a phenomenal 
ability to spread both between patients and between hospitals. What is 
special about these epidemic strains that gives them this tremendous ability 
to spread? It may be, in part, something quite simple, such as the phenotype. 
Those two epidemic strains are not only resistant to all the beta-lactam 
antibiotics – which includes cephalosporins that are widely used in hospitals 
– but are also characteristically resistant to quinolones, which would include 
ciprofloxacin and macrolides.
In an important study, the Aberdeen Royal Infirmary tabulated its use of 
those antibiotics against infections caused by the two epidemic strains and 
demonstrated the importance of antimicrobial stewardship by highlighting 
the phenomenally strong correlation between antibiotic use and the spread 
of resistance.1 What is going on nationally and internationally is not entirely 
clear, however, because all the surveillance is based on bacteraemia. It is 
not clear, for example whether these two epidemic strains are particularly 
virulent, and hence able to cause bloodstream infections, or if it is their 
ability to colonise that indirectly leads to invasion of the bloodstream. 
Bacteraemias (bloodstream infections) are frequently associated with 
intravenous catheters which are pushed through the skin to access the blood 
vessels, providing a portal of entry for bacteria on the skin. Hence if EMRSA 
strains readily colonise the skin, they may be the organisms most likely to be 
associated with catheter-related bloodstream infections.
Ciprofloxacin, in terms of its pharmacokinetics, is excreted in sweat and this 
raises the possibility that patients on the drug may actually have a thin film 
of the antibiotic covering the skin, which may perhaps disrupt normal skin 
microflora and essentially open up a new ecological niche that the MRSA can 
then colonise on the skin. When a patient has a line put in, organisms get 
direct access to the bloodstream; this may be analogous to the disruption of 
the gut microflora caused by antibiotics seen when C difficile infections arise.
The UK is not unique in this situation. The geographical distribution of several 
different lineages of S aureus across Europe have been documented and, 
mathematically, it can be shown that the distribution strongly correlates with 
health networks, in terms of referral patterns of patients between hospitals.2 
Nonetheless, some strains of MRSA clearly have much greater epidemic 
potential than others. Currently research using whole genome sequencing is 
trying to unravel what is special about those strains, but more understanding 
is still needed.
1 See Figure 1, Slide 10, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/Johnson.ppt>.
2 See Figure 3, Slide 12.
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Epidemiology of Cephalosporin: Changing Resistance in the UK 
In Chapter 1, Dame Sally Davis refers to the problem of cephalosporin 
resistance mediated by extended-spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBLs). This 
problem arose globally in the early/mid 1980s and was a significant problem 
in the UK throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During that time, the infections 
had a characteristic epidemiology. They were virtually all seen in hospitals, so 
it was very much a nosocomial (hospital-acquired) problem and, commonly, 
in high-dependency units such as intensive care units (ICUs) and neonatal 
units. The most common pathogen tended to be K pneumoniae; other Gram-
negative pathogens like E coli would crop up occasionally, but Klebsiellas 
dominated the scene. There were two main types of ESBL – TEM and SHV – 
and these were the dominant enzymes being produced by resistant bacteria.
Around 2003, the situation in the UK changed dramatically. The National 
Reference Laboratory started getting isolates from hospitals that had isolated 
E coli from urine sent in by GPs that appeared to be producing an ESBL – as 
this was unusual, the hospitals often asked the Reference Laboratory to check 
their findings and often they would be right. It subsequently became clear 
there has been a shift in the epidemiology on three fronts: there has been a 
shift in the pathogen, with E coli increasingly becoming the dominant ESBL-
producing organism in the UK. Secondly, the new strains were producing a 
new type of ESBL, known as a CTX-M type ESBL. This, in turn was leading to 
a shift in the pattern of infections, with a lot of isolates being found from 
infections in the community, particularly urinary tract infections. 
As many patients with these infections were elderly, with a history of 
regular healthcare contact, it has been difficult to disentangle how much of 
it emanates from antibiotic use in hospitals versus the community, and to 
determine the spread and so on. This is now an active area of research.
Examining the DNA
The isolates that were sent in to the reference lab were characterised using 
pulsed field gel electrophoresis. This is essentially a DNA fingerprinting tool, 
which, given that this work was done in about 2005, was a state-of-the-
art tool at the time. This was supplemented by another technique of DNA 
fingerprinting called multi locus sequence typing, or MLST, which involves 
looking at the genetic similarity of various housekeeping genes. When the 
isolates were analysed, it became clear that there were a lot of the isolates 
clustering together, showing that they were very highly genetically related. 
One particular strain – designated Strain A – appeared to be spreading quite 
dramatically, with other strains designated B, C, D and E being found which 
were related to Strain A. All of the isolates in those five strains belonged 
to the same serotype – they were all O25:H4. When looked at by MLST, 
they appeared to be part of the same lineage. In the space of a year or two, 
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not only had these new strains emerged, but they had spread dramatically 
around the country. This was similar to what had been seen previously with 
MRSA and again showed how certain strains of bacteria have a phenomenal 
ability to spread.
In fact, this particular strain has spread globally – what was seen in the UK 
had happened in many other countries around the world. Interestingly, a lot 
of countries had a similar change in the epidemiology, with elderly patients 
in the community developing urinary tract infections. This particular clone 
has been subject to whole genome sequencing, and this shows that there 
are genes encoding virulence determinants associated with an ability to 
produce urinary tract infections. So the molecular biology inside them goes 
some way to explaining the clinical correlate that is happening.
In addition to the strains that were spreading, there were many diverse 
strains with resistance present. This was due to the gene encoding the 
resistance actually spreading between these diverse strains, adding another 
layer of complexity. Not only is there spread of pathogens between patients, 
there is also spread of the genes between different organisms. 
The bacterial chromosome3 is a large circular molecule of DNA but in addition, 
bacteria have much smaller circles of DNA called plasmids that often encode 
antibiotic resistance. The problem is that bacteria can transfer their plasmids 
from one strain to another, or indeed from one species to another.
The donor strain, which is antibiotic-resistant, produces a hollow fibrous 
coated tube called a sex pilus, which makes physical contact with a recipient 
strain of bacteria.4 It makes a copy of the plasmid which is then transferred 
to the tube through the recipient which then becomes antibiotic-resistant. 
Because it is transferring a copy of the plasmid, the donor remains antibiotic-
resistant but the recipient acquires a new gene and becomes resistant in 
turn. This happens with strains of E coli but there is also inter-species transfer. 
When gonococci first became penicillin resistant, they actually acquired a 
gene for penicillin resistance that was originally found in E coli. It is the inter-
genus transfer of resistance that gives rise to the problems seen today.
Much of what has been mentioned is applicable to a range of other 
pathogens including vancomycin-resistant enterococci, K pneumoniae, 
Acinetobacter baumnanii – a common problem in intensive care units (see 
Chapter VIII); multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and cephalosporin resistance 
in gonorrhoea, which is becoming an increasingly serious problem; there 
are increasing numbers of papers appearing documenting strains spread 
3 See Slide 18, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Johnson.ppt>.
4 See Slide 19.
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between sexual networks. More recently there has been an increasing 
problem with carbapenamase-producing Gram-negative bacteria (covered 
in Chapters II and VII).
Summary
Antibiotic resistance is a complex problem because it involves a combination 
of strain spread and gene spread. There are big questions as to why certain 
strains of bacteria appear to be remarkably good at spreading while others 
do not. If these factors were better understood, it might be easier to develop 
possible interventions, such as vaccination. 
One question is: How can strain spread be prevented? If the underlying 
mechanisms were understood, it may give some possible interventions 
that could be applied at local, national and international levels. Another is 
whether plasmid spread can be prevented. This is not possible at the moment 
but is an important area for research. With the genes encoding resistance 
and spreading between different types of bacteria, a whole new magnitude 
of difficulty is being faced. 
Thirdly, a lot of gene transfer is believed to take place in the gut, because that 
is the area where large numbers of bacteria are all in close physical contact, 
allowing a high propensity for gene spread. Should researchers instead be 
looking at antibiotic resistance in commensal bacteria in the gut? Much of 
the work so far has focused on disease-causing organisms and resistance is 
a concern because it compromises treatment. Can as much be learned from 
looking at harmless bacteria as well? If a person is colonised in the gut by an 
antibiotic-resistant strain of the normal part of the gut flora, they would be 
totally asymptomatic but would have a reservoir of antibiotic resistance that 
they were unaware of. Should this be a major focus of AMR research?
And lastly, what sort of interventions can are possible? Will rapid diagnostic 
tests help in terms of screening patients? The whole area of antimicrobial 
stewardship has been highlighted and it is very important – but there is a lot 
more work to be done.
Professor Alan Johnson has worked for the Health Protection Agency and 
Public Health England (PHE) studying various aspects of antimicrobial 
resistance since the late 1980s. For part of this time he worked in the 
national Antibiotic Resistance Monitoring and Reference Laboratory, but is 
currently acting head of the Department of Healthcare-Associated Infection 
and Antimicrobial Resistance in the Health Protection Directorate of PHE. 
He is a member of the Advisory Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance and 
Healthcare-Associated Infections (ARHAI) and is currently Editor-in-Chief of 
the Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy.
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IV. Smart Use of Antibiotics: Building Confidence 
in New Approaches
Dr Hayley Wickens 
One of the many definitions of antimicrobial stewardship is ‘an activity that 
includes appropriate selection dosage, route and duration of antimicrobial 
therapy’,1 precluding any avoidable harm in the patients receiving the 
antimicrobials while avoiding a generation of resistance in the wider 
population. 
In order to attempt to achieve this at the Southampton NHS Trust, evidence-
based antimicrobial prescribing guidelines were produced and distributed to 
prescribers in the form of pocket guides and a smartphone app, to ensure 
that the best evidence base is being followed. The Trust provides educational 
programmes in hospitals for all staff who deal with antimicrobials, and audits 
how guidelines are being implemented. Feedback is also provided, because 
one of the best ways to get people to change behaviour is to give them 
information on how they are doing, particularly if there is an element of 
competition. 
Antimicrobial Stewardship in the NHS
According to data generated a few years ago from acute trusts in England,2 
99 per cent of the trusts surveyed (120 respondents, about 70 per cent of 
English hospitals) had an empiric antibiotic policy. This is good, as there 
is something to work from that is evidence-based and can help to inform 
prescribers about what they should be doing. 
Eighty-seven per cent of responding hospitals had an ‘intravenous (IV)-oral 
switch’ policy. Switching IV antibiotics to oral antibiotics is a key way of 
managing risk, and risk of infection. The minute an IV canulla is inserted, 
the patient is potentially being exposed to a bloodstream infection. It is also 
unpleasant for patients, takes nursing time and is potentially more expensive 
than oral therapy. So while IV antibiotics are crucial for treating certain 
infections, it is important to look at how early patients can be switched to oral 
where possible, and how that process can be made safer. A third of hospitals 
also have a potentially controversial ‘automatic stop’ policy, where all oral 
antibiotics are stopped after five days unless they are actively reauthorised. 
These policies are implemented by multi-disciplinary antimicrobial 
management teams and this is embedded in Department of Health policy; 
the Health and Social Care Act of 2008 says that every acute hospital has 
1 TH Dellit et al, Clinical Infectious Diseases (Vol. 44, No. 2) pp. 159–177.
2 H J Wickens and A Jacklin (2013), Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy.
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to have one of these teams. These comprise people in the hospital who 
have an interest in antimicrobial use: consultants in infectious diseases 
and microbiology, pharmacists concerned with antimicrobial or infectious 
diseases, clinicians, surgeons, senior nurses, senior pharmacists – all of 
whom can drive policy through in hospitals. 
These teams generate the evidence-based guidelines, produce the audit 
data, manage antibiotic usage and resistance, and provide education. There 
may also be also small ward-based teams, such as a consultant microbiologist 
and pharmacist, who conduct antimicrobial review ward rounds and look to 
proactively address problems with patients’ antibiotics. 
There are national steering groups in each of the four devolved administrations, 
which generate evidence and drive national policy in this area. They are the 
Antimicrobial Resistance Healthcare Association Infection group for England 
(ARHAI), Northern Ireland’s Antimicrobial Resistance Action Plan (AMRAP) 
Implementation Group, the Scottish Antimicrobial Prescribing Group (SAPG) 
and the Welsh Antimicrobial Resistance Programme (WARP).
Start Smart…
A key driver to addressing antimicrobial stewardship is ‘Start smart – then 
focus’,3 a practical document which, along with the NICE guidelines for 
neonatal sepsis discussed in Chapter VII, provides practical guidance as to 
what to do to ensure appropriate antimicrobial use.
‘Start smart’ refers to starting antimicrobials only when there is evidence 
of bacterial infection. It sounds very straightforward but it is not always so, 
particularly as it can be very difficult to tell if an infection is bacterial or viral 
– the latter will not respond to antibiotics. Secondly, it encourages using 
local guidelines in tandem with national guidelines on prescribing, because 
epidemiology differs between trusts and areas. 
It also encourages documenting decisions on the drug charts and in the 
notes. It is important to document an antibiotic is being used, what the 
durational review date for that antibiotic is, what the route is and what the 
dose is. Again, this sounds very sensible, but there is good evidence that 
until recently, only 45 to 50 per cent of antibiotics had a documentation in 
the notes in quite a few hospitals, meaning that pharmacists going round 
and reviewing the charts could not tell what the antibiotic was for, or how 
long an intravenous agent should continue for. If care is transferred between 
medical teams, to a different unit or ward, how are the receiving team meant 
to know what the treatment is for? This makes a big difference – it could be 
3 Department of Health, ‘Antimicrobial Stewardship: “Start Smart – Then Focus”’, 
November 2011, see <http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_
digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_131181.pdf>.
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three days’ treatment for an uncomplicated urinary tract infection (UTI) or 
two or more weeks’ treatment for something more complicated. 
Another important approach ‘Start smart’ encourages is to obtain cultures 
first. This is crucial because if a patient has been receiving IV antibiotics before 
a blood culture is taken, the organisms grown may not reflect the true picture. 
Also, it is important to use single-dose surgical antibiotic prophylaxis where 
appropriate as opposed to using a three- or five-day course. There is a lot of 
good evidence to suggest that a single dose of an antibiotic is sufficient to 
prevent the risk of infection during surgery for many procedures. Sometimes 
twenty-four hours is needed, but routinely extending this is unnecessary in 
many cases.
…Then Focus
The ‘then focus’ element of the document is key to ensuring implementation 
of good antimicrobial stewardship in hospitals. It says that both the diagnosis 
and the use of antibiotics should be reviewed by forty-eight hours. Patients 
should not have IV antibiotics for days without good reason. If a very sick 
patient is brought in, a broad-spectrum antibiotic might be given initially, but 
this needs to be reviewed after forty-eight hours. This process encourages 
the use of the term ‘antimicrobial prescribing decision’. 
At forty-eight hours a decision is taken decision as to what needs to be done. 
There are five options:
1. Should the antibiotic be stopped? Is there evidence that something 
other than bacterial infection is causing the problem? 
2. Could the patient be switched from IV to oral antibiotics? 
3. Could the antibiotic being used be changed or de-escalated? For 
example, once pathology results show than an infection is not caused 
by MRSA, can vancomycin be switched to flucloxacillin? 
4. Should IV treatment continue – potentially for weeks?
5. Can treatment be switched to outpatient antibiotic therapy (OPAT)? 
This is a way of delivering IV antibiotics that are not available orally to 
patients who are otherwise medically well as outpatients or in their 
home. 
The ‘Start smart – then focus’ document was a product of multi-disciplinary 
involvement and many people contributed to it. However, slightly 
controversially, there are gaps in the evidence base. Diagnostics are going 
to be very important in the coming years. Very often at present, it cannot be 
proved objectively that a patient has a bacterial infection: it could be viral or 
some other pro-inflammatory process. Being able to distinguish those from 
true bacterial infection could prevent antibiotics being started unnecessarily.
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More Research Needed
Another issue is that guidelines on antimicrobial use are produced locally 
and may potentially vary in quality. Also, the definition of what would comply 
with the guidelines can vary quite markedly between professionals such as 
pharmacists, internists and infectious diseases doctors.4 The potential for 
researching these areas is huge, not just in terms of what antimicrobial 
stewardship activities and behavioural change methods work, but also on 
more basic questions. When a doctor asks for evidence that a patient can 
successfully switch from IV to oral after forty-eight hours with no adverse 
effects, the evidence is often not there. 
Risk of Under-treatment vs Risk of Resistance
Treating a patient with a suspected bacterial infection is always a risk-benefit 
decision between the very broad-spectrum antibiotic that will kill most of the 
pathogens likely to be causing the infection and a narrow-spectrum agent 
that will only kill one type. A doctor may be reasonably sure which pathogen 
is causing the infection, but not absolutely sure, and will not have a culture 
for at least twenty-four hours. If a broad-spectrum antibiotic is used, then 
the patient is being treated, but this runs the risk of generating resistance in 
the patient’s own flora and increasing resistance more widely. This is a basic 
tenant of choosing antibiotics – the guidelines all advise minimising the use 
of broad-spectrum antibiotics and using them only where needed; use the 
narrow-spectrum where possible. But there is a risk.
Doctors are human and want to do the best for their patient, and therefore 
tend to prescribe broad-spectrum agents over narrow-spectrum agents. On 
paper, everybody will sign up to using a narrow-spectrum agent wherever 
they can – but when the sick patient is in front of them doctors tend to 
prioritise the needs of their individual patient over the public health risk. 
The wider health problem is even less concerning when someone is very 
seriously ill with sepsis, for example.
A study conducted in Dutch hospitals5 looked at several hundred prescriptions 
and compared these to the doctor’s local antibiotic guidelines. The study 
found that the non-compliant prescribing – where the prescribing did not 
match the policy – was usually too broad rather than too narrow. A third of 
all the prescriptions were too broad, even compared to their fairly broad 
empiric recommendations. When the researchers looked retrospectively at 
what organisms had caused that infection, by looking at the cultures that 
were subsequently generated, two-thirds of those prescriptions were too 
4 PGM Mol et al, ‘Reliability of assessment of adherence to an antimicrobial treatment 
guideline’, Journal of Hospital Infection (Vol. 60, 2005), pp. 321–328.
5 P G M Mol et al, ‘Limited effect of patient and disease characteristics on compliance 
with hospital antimicrobial guidelines’, European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology (Vol. 
62, 2006) pp. 297–305.
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broad (although obviously, the prescribers did not have the benefit of that 
knowledge at the time). 
The most worrying find was that there was little practice of streamlining or 
de-escalation. So instead of having broad-spectrum for the first two days 
then narrowing it down once the pathogen was identified, this was not 
happening effectively. The patient was getting better but the exposure to the 
broad-spectrum antibiotic carried on rather than the streamlining occurring. 
The study also looked at the availability of culture results and how that 
influenced prescribing. Culture results had no impact on compliance in 
sepsis, but was associated with more compliance in UTIs and with respiratory 
tract infections. The paper states: ‘Defensive behaviour may be driven by 
fear of high mortality rates and the fact that inadequate bacteria coverage 
has been correlated with increased mortality’. In the ‘Surviving Sepsis’ 
recommendations,6 no-one would dispute that appropriate antimicrobial 
therapy for very sick patients needs to be started very promptly. This does 
not mean, however, that the treatment cannot be reviewed afterwards.
Gaps in the Evidence Base
More information is needed on whether the infection needing treatment 
is bacterial or not. Rapid diagnostics can contribute to this but so too can 
looking at what combination of signs, symptoms and objective data can be 
used to ascertain if a patient has a bacterial infection and starting the drug 
according to the policy. At the moment, prescribing guidelines can ask to 
provide feedback and appear to be 95 per cent compliant. However, all this 
shows is that the doctors are writing down the presumed diagnosis and 
getting the right drug for that diagnosis. It does not record whether the 
diagnosis was correct. This is the information that is needed to see whether 
there was a bacterial infection or not.
It is also important to know how likely it is that a resistant organism is being 
treated. In Chapter III, Professor Johnson mentions the increase in resistance 
in Gram-negatives causing UTIs. In certain areas of London, an elderly patient 
from the community with a UTI will have a reasonable chance of carrying an 
ESBL and will need IV therapy to treat the infection. Other parts of London 
and rural areas may not have that issue, however.
The key to addressing this is getting good epidemiological data, particularly 
for community pathogens. What is submitted through hospital laboratories 
represents the tip of the iceberg, because only patients who have had 
treatment failures or recurrent infections will have a urinary specimen sent. 
6 R P Dellinger et al, ‘Surviving Sepsis Campaign: International Guidelines for 
Management of Severe Sepsis and Septic Shock: 2012’, Critical Care Medicine Journal 
(Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013) pp. 580–637.
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This misses what is causing the majority of UTIs as specimens are not sent 
for routine, run-of-the-mill cases. So national data is useful but local data is 
key – and there is not always good integrated use of such data.
Severity Scoring
Severity scoring is also an issue. There are a few severity scoring methods 
that could help to decide whether to go for a broad-spectrum or narrow-
spectrum antibiotic. Could a narrow-spectrum drug be used if the patient’s 
symptoms are less severe? There are a few scores available such as CURB-65 
for community-wide pneumonia,7 which looks at factors such as blood 
pressure, respiratory rate and age. The more points a patient scores, the 
more severely ill they are, so the more likely they are to need a broad-
spectrum antibiotic. This is very useful, but there is a lack in the evidence 
base around which patients could be given narrow-spectrum drugs, and 
there are a lot of conditions that have no equivalent scoring system. It is also 
possible that, even when there are scoring systems, clinicians tend to have a 
low awareness of them.
There is a lack of evidence on de-escalation, too. One weakness in much of 
the literature in this area is that it is retrospective. For example, if patients 
who were switched from IV drug x to oral drug y made a full recovery, it 
might have been because they were on IVs until they got better, and then 
had some additional oral treatment at the end. Patients need to be more 
aggressively switched (while they are still recovering), so that evidence can 
be built up on what works, and what if any risks are associated with it. At the 
moment good data on this is not available.
Also, while it is known that treatment of antimicrobials drives resistance and 
potentially exposes patients to infections such as C difficile, the evidence that 
prolonged courses are associated with negative effect is not well established. 
It is thought that prolonged use is a bad idea and that C difficile is associated 
with antibiotic use so it makes sense to minimise courses, but there are no 
studies that show that ten days of augmentin for a community-acquired 
pneumonia will give worse outcomes than five, for example. This is the type 
of data needed.
Possible Solutions
One approach used at Southampton is the Antibiotic Therapy Quick-
Reference Guide.8 This has driven a lot of interest in the evidence base and 
7 W S Lim et al, ‘Defining community acquired pneumonia severity on presentation to 
hospital: an international derivation and validation study’, Thorax (Vol. 58, 2003), pp. 
377–382.
8 See Figure 1, Slide 8, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/Wickens.ppt>
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similar guides are planned for all common infections, including community-
acquired pneumonia and straightforward UTIs. 
Each guide has a summary of the evidence at the top with a case definition, 
so for example for hospital-acquired pneumonia, this will be for patients 
who have been in hospital for longer than forty-eight hours. Evidence of the 
infections will include information such as white cell counts, CRP (C-reactive 
protein) levels, a severity assessment and the epidemiology, in terms of 
what organisms typically cause this infection. It is known, for example, that 
in the case of cellulitis it is usually Gram-positive organisms that live on the 
skin. This information could be derived from studies or local epidemiological 
information, but suitable data are not always available.
The guide then looks at what can be used in severe and non-severe infections, 
in penicillin allergy and non-penicillin allergy, and the evidence available 
to support this. Local epidemiological data is also included, as are all the 
references. This gives an overview of all the evidence for the treatment of a 
particular infection, and the information will be centralised so that anybody 
can access it.
Summary
Implementing antimicrobial stewardship and the ‘Start Smart – Then 
Focus’ report highlights the need to make sure that the decision to start an 
antimicrobial is sound. Important areas for further research are syndromic 
diagnosis, molecular diagnostics, and also how to determine that a patient 
has a bacterial infection so that starting an antibiotic is justified.
It is important to know when to choose the narrowest-spectrum antibiotic 
that will work safely, while not denying the broad-spectrum ones where 
patients need them. De-escalation is absolutely key. Lastly, more information 
is needed on clinical outcomes in early discontinuation and also on course 
lengths, so that they can be reduced safely. 
Dr Hayley Wickens is a consultant pharmacist in anti-infectives at University 
Hospital Southampton NHS Trust. She was a founder member of the UK 
Clinical Pharmacy Association Infection Management Group Committee, 
and a member of the Department of Health SACAR Professional Education 
committee. She is an honorary lecturer at Imperial College London, an editor 
for the Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy and, on behalf of the British 
Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy, is the UK data co-ordinator for the 
European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption project hosted by ECDC.

V. Lessons Identified and Opportunities in 
Developing and Implementing NICE Clinical 
Guideline 149: Antibiotics for Early-onset 
Neonatal Infection
Dr Jim Gray
Neonatal Intensive Care Units (NICUs) represent a microcosm of the 
general challenges related to antibiotic use in the twenty-first century and 
to antibiotic resistance in general. Neonates receiving intensive care are 
at high risk of developing serious bacterial infections. These infections are 
often difficult to diagnose because the early signs of infection may be subtle 
and difficult to distinguish from other morbidities. At the same time, prompt 
institution of antibiotic therapy for true infections in neonates is vital to 
avoid serious long-term morbidity and mortality. All of this means that there 
are high levels of antibiotic prescribing on NICUs; however, most neonates 
who receive antibiotics on NICUs do not have bacterial infections. It is 
important to limit unnecessary antibiotic use because NICUs are high-risk 
areas for the selection and spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, especially 
the multi-resistant, extensively drug-resistant and pandrug-resistant Gram-
negative bacteria that pose the greatest threat to the ongoing ability to treat 
infections with current antibiotics.1 
Faced with the growing threat presented by these bacteria, surveillance 
programmes have been introduced in many NICUs. Staff at Birmingham 
Women’s Hospital have been undertaking weekly surveillance of all NICU 
babies for the past two years: during that time 2.6 per cent of babies have 
been found to be colonised with antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacteria. 
Fortunately, as others have found, very few of these babies have gone on to 
develop infections with these bacteria. However, it is not known whether 
or not this background prevalence of antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative 
bacteria is a stable situation. There must be a risk in any population that 
as the number of individuals asymptomatically colonised with antibiotic-
resistant bacteria increases a threshold will be reached above which these 
bacteria also become an important, and even predominant, cause of clinical 
infections. 
Antibiotic Prescribing for Early-onset Neonatal Sepsis: A Sizeable Problem
The sheer scale of unnecessary antibiotic use in neonates is exemplified 
by comparing the number of newborn babies who are treated with IV 
antibiotics with relatively accurate national data on the incidence of early-
1 M Souli, I Galani and H Giamarellou, ‘Emergence of extensively drug–resistant and 
pandrug–resistant Gram–negative bacilli in Europe’, Euro Surveill (Vol. 13, No. 47, 
2008) pp. ii:19045.
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onset neonatal sepsis.2 There are around 600,000 births per year in England. 
Intravenous antibiotics are administered to around 10 per cent of newborn 
babies,3 whereas the incidence of early-onset neonatal sepsis is only around 
one in a thousand births. It is acknowledged that a proportion of babies 
with early-onset neonatal sepsis will have negative cultures for one reason 
or another; nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that between 90 and 
99 per cent of newborns treated with antibiotics do not have a bacterial 
infection. Over-prescription of antibiotics in other age groups within and 
outside hospitals is also common for the same reason, i.e. that prescribers 
lack certainty that it is safe to withhold empiric antibiotics. 
Figure 1: Intravenous Antibiotics Administered to Newborn Babies
600,000 deliveries pa
60,000 babies treated 
with antibiotics
600 babies with early-
onset neonatal sepsis
59,400 babies without 
infection treated with 
antibiotics
Clearer clinical guidance on when it is safe to withhold antibiotics could 
assist prescribers, but in many healthcare settings (especially in primary 
care) it may not be seen as safe or logistically feasible to withhold antibiotics 
because of the need for a further clinical consultation. A more promising 
approach will be to investigate antibiotic treatment decision-making based 
on the new generation of miniaturised molecular diagnostic tests that are 
becoming available. These tests require no skilled hands-on time and offer 
the potential of detecting (or excluding the presence of) a range of common 
pathogens in clinical samples at the point of care in under an hour.
Antibiotics are Not without Harm
Antibiotics used correctly are life-saving. However, antibiotic treatment is 
also associated with adverse clinical effects but this is not well recognised 
by the public. Perhaps surprisingly, given the publicity around healthcare 
2 See Slide 6 in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Jim_
Gray.pptx>.
3 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, ‘Antibiotics for early–onset 
neonatal infection: Antibiotics for the prevention and treatment of early–onset 
neonatal infection’, CG149 (London, August 2012).
Conference Report 39
associated infections, the general public continue to perceive many adverse 
effects of medical care as unimportant and unavoidable.4 There is, of course, 
some public awareness of the association between antibiotic use in hospitals 
and C difficile infection, especially in the elderly. However, even here there 
is probably a perception that dirty hospitals, rather than antibiotics, are the 
chief reason why people get C difficile infection. 
Also, individuals prescribed antibiotics outside the hospital inpatient setting 
almost certainly do not perceive any risk of C difficile infection. Equally, there 
appears to be little public concern about the milder but still inconvenient 
side effects (such as gastrointestinal upset) that trials of new antibiotics 
suggest are experienced by at least 10 per cent of people treated with these 
agents. There is also little or no public knowledge of other risks to health 
associated exposure to broad-spectrum antibiotics, such as the evidence 
that in early life they may increase the risk of common childhood conditions 
such as asthma and atopic dermatitis. 
Another approach to limiting antibiotic use may therefore be to provide more 
public education to change the perception that antibiotics offer a no-risk 
therapeutic option. Of course any such campaign would have to be carefully 
planned to ensure that individuals with infections that required antibiotic 
therapy were not discouraged from taking them.
NICE Guideline 149, Antibiotics for Early-onset Neonatal Infection
In August 2012, NICE Guideline 149, ‘Antibiotics for early-onset neonatal 
infection: Antibiotics for the prevention and treatment of early-onset neonatal 
infection’5 was published. There are two broad antibiotic-related themes 
within this guidance. First, it was clearly necessary to recommend antibiotics 
that are effective and safe for neonates with early-onset systemic infections. 
The second objective was to limit overall antibiotic use by providing guidance 
to help restrict the number of patients prescribed antibiotics; guidance on 
safely stopping antibiotics when infection is excluded; and guidance on 
limiting the duration of antibiotic therapy for infections.
In developing the guidance, the Guideline Development Group (GDG) was 
regularly constrained by the limited amount of good-quality published 
evidence on all aspects of antibiotic treatment of neonatal infections. As a 
result, the GDG often had to rely on expert opinion rather than evidence 
from good-quality clinical trials. 
4 J Tanner, W Padley, S Davey, K Murphy and B Brown, ‘Patient narratives of surgical site 
infection: implications for practice’, Journal of Hospital Infection (Vol. 83, 2013) pp. 
41–45.
5 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, ‘Antibiotics for early–onset 
neonatal infection’.
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Recommending Safe and Effective Treatment
In order to be able to recommend antibiotics for suspected pathogens, 
knowledge is needed of the causative organisms of early-onset neonatal sepsis 
and their antibiotic susceptibilities. The aim of empiric antibiotic therapy is 
to ensure coverage against the range of expected pathogens, while at the 
same time minimising the risk of selection of antibiotic resistance. The GDG 
also heard expert evidence of the risks of long-term morbidity in babies from 
treatment with broad-spectrum antibiotics, especially the cephalosporins. 
The GDG was quickly able to reach a consensus that benzyl penicillin plus 
gentamicin was the most appropriate first-line antibiotic regimen to target 
the causes of early-onset neonatal sepsis with the least risk of exerting 
selective pressure on antibiotic resistance. However, when the published 
literature on causes of early-onset neonatal sepsis was reviewed, it was 
found that many studies reported – probably inaccurately – that bacteria 
such as coagulase-negative staphylococci were common causes of early-
onset neonatal sepsis. These bacteria are usually resistant to antibiotics such 
as benzyl penicillin and gentamicin. Thus there is a risk that even when local 
microbiology data are available to guide selection of antibiotics, clinicians 
will misinterpret these data. Greater involvement of microbiology services 
in providing accurate data on the causes of true infection may therefore be 
helpful in promoting good antibiotic stewardship.
Limiting Antibiotic Exposure
Central to limiting the number of patients treated with antibiotics was 
stratifying patients according to the risk of infection. The guideline identifies 
a number of clinical signs (‘red flags’) that in isolation should be an absolute 
indication for antibiotic therapy (Table 1). Otherwise, the guideline 
recommends that antibiotic therapy is indicated only when two or more of a 
wide range of softer risk factors for infection or signs of infection are present. 
Importantly, the guideline emphasises that, where indicated, antibiotic 
therapy must be commenced early, within a target time of thirty to sixty 
minutes. 
A similar risk factor and clinical indicator model for commencing antibiotic 
therapy could feasibly be applied to other patient groups. 
The other element to limiting antibiotic exposure is a set of recommendations 
about when antibiotics should be discontinued. The GDG considered 
evidence to support a recommendation that empiric antibiotic therapy could 
be discontinued at thirty-six hours based on clinical judgement, supported 
by a normal C-reactive protein (CRP) value at eighteen to twenty-four hours 
and negative blood cultures at thirty-six hours. Whilst it was recognised that 
obtaining these laboratory results within strict timescales would force many 
hospital laboratories to change working practices, the benefits in terms 
of cost savings and reduction in antibiotic prescribing makes the case for 
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changing practice compelling. This concept is consistent with the Department 
of Health’s ‘Start smart - then focus’ campaign, discussed in Chapter IV. There 
are opportunities for research to investigate if even earlier assessments of 
the need to continue empiric antibiotic therapy can be made, and also to 
investigate translating the principles of the NICE Guidance into assessment 
of other patient groups.
For neonates who remain on antibiotic therapy for confirmed or suspected 
systemic sepsis, the GDG found an absence of clinical trial data on which to 
base recommendations on duration of treatment. It was concluded that in 
the absence of evidence of meningitis, seven days’ treatment was adequate 
for uncomplicated infections, but it is likely that many clinicians err towards 
giving longer courses of treatment than that, and it is possible that courses 
of less than seven days would be equally effective.
Summary
The NICE Guideline ‘Antibiotics for Early-onset Neonatal Infection’ aimed to 
define clear criteria for commencing and discontinuing antibiotic therapy. 
Many of the principles contained within this guideline could be applicable 
to other patient groups. There are opportunities for further research 
around almost all aspects of antibiotic therapy. In particular, the growing 
trend towards point of care testing and the development of new diagnostic 
strategies for infections that are not dependent on overnight incubation for 
results offer real potential to better target antibiotic therapy towards those 
patients who need it. 
Jim Gray is consultant microbiologist at Birmingham Children’s Hospital and 
Birmingham Women’s Hospital. He was part of the Guideline Development 
Group that worked on the development of NICE Clinical Guideline 149: 
Antibiotics for Early-onset Neonatal Infection.
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Table 1: Red Flag and Other Risk Factors for, and Clinical Indicators of, Early-
onset Neonatal Infection 
Red flag risk factors and clinical indicators (presence 
of one of these should prompt antibiotic therapy)
Other risk factors and clinical indicators (two or more 
must be present before starting antibiotic therapy)
Parenteral antibiotic treatment given to the mother 
for confirmed or suspected invasive bacterial infection 
within twenty-four hours of the birth
Seizures in the baby
Signs of shock in the baby
Mechanical ventilation in a term baby 
Suspected or confirmed infection in a co-twin
Respiratory distress starting more than four hours after 
birth
Invasive group B streptococcal (GBS) infection in a 
previous baby 
Maternal GBS colonisation or infection in the current 
pregnancy
Prelabour rupture of membranes 
Preterm birth following spontaneous labour (before 
thirty-seven weeks’ gestation) 
Suspected or confirmed rupture of membranes for >18 
hours in a preterm birth
Intrapartum fever higher than 38°C, or confirmed or 
suspected chorioamnionitis
Altered behaviour or responsiveness
Altered muscle tone 
Feeding difficulties or feed intolerance
Abnormal heart rate 
Signs of respiratory distress or apnoea
Hypoxia 
Jaundice within twenty-four hours of birth
Apnoea
Signs of neonatal encephalopathy
Need for cardio–pulmonary resuscitation
Mechanical ventilation in a preterm baby
Persistent fetal circulation 
Temperature abnormality
Unexplained excessive bleeding, thrombocytopenia or 
abnormal coagulation
Oliguria persisting >24 hours after birth
Altered glucose homeostasis
Metabolic acidosis
Local infection (eg, of skin or eye)
VI. Optimising Treatments to Tackle Anti-
microbial Challenges: Nanomedicines and 
Molecular Targeted Medicines
Dr Andreas Schätzlein
Finding new treatments for cancer and tackling antimicrobial resistance are 
closely linked. Many of the cancer treatments used widely at present, including 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy, compromise the patient’s immune system 
and leave them more susceptible to infection; antibiotics are therefore often 
given to patients as a prophylactic, or preventative treatment, to prevent 
infection from taking hold. Surgery, which is also required in many cancer 
treatments, also leaves patients vulnerable to infection. Nanomedicines 
offer an alternative that targets cancer cells while leaving the immune system 
unaffected and thus would enable antibiotics to be used less widely.
Cancer evolves from a local disease into a systemic disease, i.e. it spreads 
throughout the body. So while the best treatment for local cancer is surgery, 
or radiotherapy if it is more advanced, there are few options other than 
systemic treatment when a cancer has spread and develops into what is 
called metastasis. A large proportion of cancers that reach that stage remain 
incurable even today. 
Some cytotoxic therapies (therapies that kill cells) have been useful in treating 
some forms of cancer, especially if the cancers are discovered early. They do 
have some side effects, however, and this is where, in improving systemic 
cancer therapies through the use of nanonmedicines, there may be scope in 
reducing some of the side effects. The history and development of cytotoxic 
therapies is rather unpleasant: alkalyting agents, one of the mainstays of 
chemotherapy applications, were developed during the first and second 
world wars for use in trench warfare, as mustard gas. Mustard gas is an agent 
that gave rise to nitrogen mustards; then, in 1942 it was discovered in the 
US that these types of agents can be used to treat lymphomas, heralding 
the age of chemotherapy. Chemotherapy agents used today have similar 
mechanisms and actions and are tremendously important.
These agents are, however, relatively non-specific: for example, they 
covalently crosslink DNA molecules, which inhibits cell proliferation and 
leads to apoptosis – the programmed death of those cancer cells. This type 
of treatment is most effective against rapidly proliferating cells such as cancer 
cells, but it also affects all other rapidly growing cells in the body. This causes 
the familiar side effects of diarrhoea and loss of hair, because cells in those 
tissues also grow rapidly and are also poisoned by the treatment. Agents 
such as cyclophosphomid, one of the derivatives of mustard gases, can be 
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altered to change their reactivity and make them less aggressive though still 
workable; but treatment is still unpleasant for the patient.
A War of Attrition
Unfortunately, cancer is a war of attrition in which all the cancer cells need to 
be killed off; even if only a very small fraction remain, this is likely to lead to 
an eventual regrowth of the cancer. So it is essential to kill all the cancer cells, 
but at the same time deal with the side effects. The most relevant of these 
for antimicrobial resistance are to do with immuno-suppression, induced by 
shutting down the production of new immune cells in the bone marrow.
A balance has to be found between maximising the dose of chemotherapeutic 
drug in order to kill as many cancer cells as possible and, on the other hand, 
minimising the damage these agents do to normal cells, including immune 
cells. If the quantity of immune cells in the patient’s blood is reduced too far, 
the patient is left with insufficient capacity to fight off microbes. They become 
immune-suppressed and are more likely to have microbial infections. 
To avoid this situation, chemotherapeutic cancer therapies are typically 
interrupted by treatment breaks to allow the number of immune cells to 
recover before the next cycle of treatment. During each recovery period, 
however, the cancer cells continue to grow. Whether the patient is eventually 
cured – or at least has a temporary respite from the cancer – or whether the 
cancer wins will therefore depend on how well a drug’s toxicity to normal 
cells and cancer cells can be balanced.
In order to maximise the effect against cancer, combinations of drugs with 
different side-effect profiles are often used. When the drugs’ side effects and 
toxicity affect different tissues or do not occur at the same time, it becomes 
possible to combine their therapeutic effects to achieve better cancer-cell 
kill rates while avoiding additive toxicity and extreme damage to the patient.
Drug combinations are also important in terms of avoiding resistance – this 
problem is as important in cancer as it is in microbiological diseases. By using 
drugs which have different modes of actions it is much more likely that all 
cancer cells will be killed because it is much less likely that cells with two 
or more resistance mechanisms will be present or will be able to develop 
during treatment.
Cancer-specific Targets
Current cytotoxic therapies and their use resemble the broad-spectrum 
agents used in antimicrobial therapy. However, a paradigm shift has led to 
a focusing of drug development efforts on the use of more specific drugs. 
The research efforts of recent decades have led to the discovery of a range 
of cancer-specific targets. While there is a huge amount of data available 
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on molecular variations of various cancers, however, it is often difficult to 
understand how they all may be connected to drive the development and 
evolution of cancers.
One way of understanding the organising principles of the molecular 
changes in cancer cells was proposed by Hanahan and Wineberg in 2000.1 
They identified a number of typical properties, so-called hallmarks, which 
are central to the progression of every cancer. All cancers that reach a point 
where they kill their patient will eventually acquire these hallmark properties. 
For example, one of the properties cancers have to acquire is the ability for 
sustained growth independent of normal regulation. Normally, cell growth is 
tightly regulated to make sure it only occurs when needed, but cancer cells 
acquire the ability to grow in the absence of these normal growth signals. 
There are different ways in which cancer cells can acquire this capability; 
for instance, different cancers will be reliant on different signalling pathways 
and regulatory molecules, but all cancers need to find a way to acquire this 
hallmark in order to grow to the point where they kill the patient. 
Another example for such a hallmark characteristic would be the ability of 
cancer cells to resist cell death – they are able to ignore physiological signals 
that should induce cell death. Again, individual cancers may have different 
pathways, but ultimately all aggressive cancers have to acquire the ability to 
resist cell death. 
The application of these insights to therapy raises the potential of cancer-
specific drug treatments. If it is possible to interfere with targets and 
pathways that a cancer uses to acquire a hallmark property, such treatments 
would have little effect on normal cells, but would offer a strategy to treat 
cancer in a more specific way compared to the non-specific, ‘broad-spectrum’ 
chemotherapeutic drugs.
A prototypical example for a drug that targets a cancer specific pathway 
would be the use of Glivec in chronic myelogenous leukaemia (CML), a 
cancer of the bone marrow. Here precursors of certain blood cells become 
cancerous and start to proliferate. Over time, they displace the healthy 
cells. The cause for this excessive proliferation is a mutation caused by a 
chromosome displacement: about 95 per cent of CML patients have this 
so called ‘Philadelphia’ chromosome, caused by the breaking and incorrect 
fusion of two different chromosomes. As a consequence, the structural 
part of one gene responsible for making a growth factor is now linked to a 
regulatory sequence of an altogether different gene. The resulting molecule 
1 See Figure 1, Slide 5 in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/Schatzlein_Part_One.pdf>.
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– the Abl-kinase – drives inappropriate blood-cell proliferation and thus 
leads to the development of the CML cancer.
The BCR-Abl Kinase is a good example of a cancer-specific target as this 
molecule is the result of a mutation that does not exist in healthy cells. 
Targeting drug development efforts to try to inhibit this faulty molecule has 
led to the discovery of Imatinib, which is marketed as the drug Glivec. This 
drug stops the BCR-Abl kinase from activating proliferation and is essentially 
a cancer specific drug. It has been very successful and has changed the way 
CML is treated. The side effect profile is completely different from that of 
chemotherapeutic drugs; for example, it does not show the same tendency to 
suppress the immune system and make the patient vulnerable to infections. 
Clearly, such molecular targeted drugs demonstrate the potential of more 
cancer specific therapies and have heralded a new area of cancer treatment. 
The Options
If cancer-specific molecular targets are known, the best approach may be to 
try to create drugs that target these. Given the complexity, time and resource 
implications of developing drugs for all the relevant targets, other strategies 
to increase drug specificity and avoid side effects are also being explored. 
A conceptually simple approach is to try to maximise exposure of the tumour 
to the drug and minimise exposure of the healthy tissues. This is the strategy 
followed in the development of nano-medicines. Nano-medicines enable 
the use of drugs which may be more toxic and less specific, but by creating a 
situation where the drug is carried to the site of the disease while avoiding 
healthy tissue, it can effectively treat a tumour and avoid the side effects that 
would otherwise occur. The general principle used to achieve this effect using 
nano-medicines is to create a carrier in which the drug can be encapsulated. 
If it is possible to control where in the body the carrier goes, this can be used 
to direct the drug to the site of the disease. 
The Nano Scale
One of the obvious properties of nanomaterials is that they are very small – in 
the order of 1/1000th the thickness of a human hair. Apart from being small, 
nano-scaled materials acquire new and useful properties. For example, as 
the diameter of a particle becomes smaller, its surface becomes relatively 
more important compared to its volume: more and more of its molecules 
are in direct contact with the environment. These surface molecules will 
therefore determine how these particles behave in a biological environment. 
By systematically modifying the surface molecules, nanoparticles can then 
be targeted to tumours to deliver their cargo.
Biocompatible polymers can be engineered through chemical modifications 
to self-assemble into nanoparticles that have the capacity to carry drug 
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molecules. When drugs are carried in these nanoparticles, they are protected 
from the enzymatic degradation that can occur in the blood or the gut. In 
addition, they are also able to dramatically increase the amount of drug that 
can be transported across biological barriers such as the gut. 
For example, taken orally, peptides are normally degraded in the gut and 
have no effect but by putting them in polymer carriers they can be given 
orally and taken up into the bloodstream.2 This method can be used to treat 
pancreatic cancer in animals using a nano-enabled oral peptide pill and, as 
it is a very specific therapy, there are no problems with side effects such as 
immune-suppression.
A similar strategy to enhance the amount of drug that can be given is a 
nano-enabled form of the anti-cancer drug lomustine. This drug is poorly 
water soluble, which can make it difficult to give in sufficient quantity or 
may require patients to receive it as prolonged infusions. Lomustine is a drug 
which, in principle, is effective against brain cancer. Most drugs do not easily 
reach the brain because it is separated from the rest of the body and blood 
stream by the blood–brain barrier. This normally protects the brain from 
toxic molecules and metabolites but its presence can make the treatment of 
brain cancers difficult because drugs do not reach the tumour. Increasing the 
concentration in the blood can increase the amount of drug that reaches the 
brain but for cytotoxic drugs, this increase of drug dose is typically associated 
with an increase in toxicity, i.e. immunosuppression.
Loumistine has been packaged into nanoparticles to treat animals with brain 
cancer, reducing cancer growth and extending the animals’ survival. In fact, 
packing drugs into nanoparticles can increase the amount of the drug given 
by a factor of ten. Importantly, by using the nanoparticles it becomes possible 
not only to increase the dose and increase the amount of drug in the brain 
but also to avoid the expected increase in side effects. This is illustrated by 
the lack of effect on body weight, a surrogate marker for toxicity, or numbers 
of white blood cells. Even with ten times the amount of drug, the toxicity 
does not increase.3
Another way in which specificity of cancer therapies can be increased while 
minimising side effects involves direct use of our understanding of the 
genetic differences between healthy cells and tumour cells through genetic 
therapies. These types of therapies provide ways to be highly specific – more 
so than is possible with proteins – but the current bottleneck to their wider 
2 See Slide 10, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Schatzlein_Part_One.pdf>.
3 See Slide 1, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Schatzlein_Part_Two.pdf>.
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use stems from the problems associated with the delivery of these genetic 
medicines to the cancer cells.
Currently the key challenge for the wider use of these therapies lies in the safe 
and efficacious delivery of the gene to the tumour. Again, nanoparticles are 
one of the strategies used. Nanoparticles have been developed that contain 
the gene for tumour necrosis factor alpha (TNFα), a very potent cytokine. 
TNFα given as a protein provides a very effective, but potentially dangerous, 
way of treating some tumours as the side effects can kill the patient. The only 
way to use this drug for treatment at the moment is by treating tumours in a 
part of the body that can be isolated from the general blood circulation, such 
as sarcomas of a limb. 
Genetic therapies could make a difference here, particularly if given 
intravenously. By comparing animals treated with hTR-mMTNF (human 
telomerase RNA-murine Tumour Necrosis Factor) Dufrès et all (2005)4 
showed that in the treated animals, the tumours disappear rapidly; in the 
untreated animals they do not. 
The molecule is effective and body weight does not change between the 
different treatment groups, which also suggests that it is very safe. About 80 
per cent of the animals can be cured completely using this method. By using 
nanoparticles to deliver the gene for TNFα, this therapy can be given safely 
intravenously to treat tumours without the toxicity that is associated with 
the adminsitrarion of the TNFα protein.
Nano-enabled Anti-infectives: Amphotericin B
Nanomedicines enable more effective use of antibiotic drugs; one example 
of this is a nano-enabled form amphotericin B, a drug effective against 
leishmaniasis and systemic fungal infections. The main limitations to its 
use are related to its kidney toxicity and the need for administration by 
intravenous infusion. A nano-enabled form of this drug that can be given 
orally as a capsule targets the drug away from the kidney towards the liver 
and lung, where the disease resides.
More specific cancer therapies can therefore help to avoid side effects such 
as immunosuppression frequently associated with high dose chemotherapy, 
which makes patients susceptible to microbial infections and requires the 
use of antibiotics. Such improved specificity can come from drugs directed 
against cancer-specific molecular targets or, alternatively, nano-sized carriers 
can be used to direct the drug to the tumour and spare the healthy cells. 
Thus, cancer pharmacology and nanotechnology can be used to reduce the 
pressure on antimicrobial therapy.
4 See Slide 4, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Schatzlein_Part_Two.pdf>.
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Learning from AMR
Cancer research may also be able to learn from the experience of 
microbiologists in particular with respect to AMR, as there are some common 
biological mechanisms at play. Cancer cells work as populations: they evolve 
based on their ability to rapidly acquire genetic changes. By acquiring 
new mutations, cancer cells in a tumour can evolve into a heterogeneous 
population. When such populations are exposed to anti-cancer drugs, a 
selective pressure is exerted which will give the fittest cells – those with 
mutations conferring drug resistance – a survival advantage. These resistant 
mutants may thrive once the majority of tumour cells have been killed and 
may give rise to a resistant tumour that could eventually kill the patient.
The idea that tumours evolve along Darwinian principles has been developing 
and, at the end of 2012, an artilce in The New England Journal of Medicine 
showed a kidney cancer5 for which the expression of specific genes in different 
parts of the tumour had been determined. It becomes clear that the tumour 
is not a homogenous mass where all the cancer cells are the same, but rather 
they exist as a population of cells that can compete and adapt. The research 
team not only looked at the original tumour but also the metastases where 
the cancer had spread to the patient’s lungs and chest wall. The gene 
expression profiles in those metastases, together with those in the original 
tumour, allowed the research team to create a phylogenetic tree tracing the 
tumour development and the sequence mutations in subpopulations that 
were involved in the process. 
The Importance of Population
The tumour therefore represents a heterogeneous population of cancer cells 
that evolve following Darwinian principles. When cancer is treated with any 
type of drug, the population is exposed to a selective pressure. The more 
heterogeneous the cell population, the higher the risk that cells may exist 
which may have some resistance against the therapy. Such cells would be 
likely to survive therapy and would be able to pass this resistance on or to 
the daughter cells on division. While non-resistant cells would be killed, 
resistant cells would have a growth advantage and would be likely to thrive. 
Furthermore, in some cases cancer cells go further in adapting to their 
‘biotope’; for example, they may take advantage of anti-apoptotic signals 
(signals that indicate a delay in, or prevention of, cell death) secreted by 
non-cancer cells such as some immune cells within the tumour, which may 
come to play an involuntary role in supporting the cancer cells. Again, there 
is potential overlap here with the development of AMR. Populations are very 
important in the area of AMR: biofilms work together, they evolve to create 
properties which make them much more difficult to treat. Thus for cancer 
5 See Slide 7, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/
Schatzlein_Part_Two.pdf>.
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and microbiology, understanding how heterogeneous populations fit into 
their ‘biotope’ and co-develop may become increasingly important as a way 
to develop new ways for treating diseases which can constantly evolve in 
response to a changing environment.
The infections that are relevant to AMR may depend on an abnormal biotope 
or ‘pathobiotope’ and treatment strategies that tackle changes in the biotope 
may become more important as a way to control evolving and adaptable 
pathogens. It may be important not only to think about the patients, but also 
about their wider environment as a biotope, as an ecosystem that needs to 
be considered in terms of how it works together, in order to understand how 
pathological infections can be limited.
Dr Andreas G Schätzlein is a reader in cancer pharmacology at University 
College London. His research interests focus on the discovery and development 
of targeted anti-cancer drugs and nanomedicines. In 2006 Dr Schätzlein 
joined the School of Pharmacy at UCL, where he co-founded Nanomerics 
Ltd, a UCL spinout company developing pharmaceutical nanotechnology, 
supported by the Technology Strategy Board.
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VII. The Rise of Carbapenem-resistant Organisms
Professor Mike Sharland
Carbapenem resistant organisms (CROs) are Gram-negative members of the 
Enterobacteriaceae group (bacteria present within the human gut). These 
organisms are difficult to treat because they have high levels of resistance to 
carbapenems, a powerful group of broad-spectrum beta-lactam (penicillin-
related) antibiotics. Carbapenems (imipenem, meropenem, and ertapenem) 
are considered a last-resort antibiotic regimen for the treatment of infections 
caused by multi-resistant bacteria. CROs are resistant to carbapenems as 
they are able to produce carbapenem-hydrolysing beta-lactamases. Over 
the last decade, carbapenem resistance has steadily increased among 
Enterobacteriaceae isolates including Klebsiella species and E coli. 
Infections caused by CROs are rare in healthy individuals and are most 
commonly seen in patients with weaker immune systems, such as and those 
with chronic underlying medical problems, the very young or old and those 
in intensive care units. Once introduced into a healthcare facility, CROs can 
quite rapidly become endemic if not identified and efficient infection control 
measures need to be implemented swiftly to limit the spread of these 
pathogens. CRO infections are extremely difficult to treat and are commonly 
associated with significantly increased mortality and morbidity. Only one or 
two older antibiotics, including colistin, remain to treat such infections. The 
increased use of these antibiotics of last resort will increase the potential for 
the development of pan-resistant organisms – where there are no effective 
antibiotics at all. 
The names given to resistant organisms are complicated but generally 
include the name of the bacteria (e.g. Klebsiella pneumoniae), the enzyme 
they carry (e.g. carbapenemase), and the antibiotic-resistant gene(s) within 
the bacteria.
Klebsiella pneumoniae Carbapenemase
K pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) producing bacteria are a type of CRO 
whose emergence, increased incidence and rapid clonal spread in recent 
years is of considerable concern nationally and internationally. Since their 
emergence in the last decade KPC and its clones have rapidly become endemic 
in regions of the United States, Italy and Greece, as well as in countries of 
South America and the Far East. 
The ability of resistant clones to spread and to quickly become endemic is 
best exemplified by the alarming and rapid spread of KPCs within healthcare 
facilities in Italy, where KPC clones were first isolated in two hospitals in 
late 2008. At the time, this was not regarded as a major problem but by 
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2009, isolates were identified in a few of the larger Italian hospitals and by 
late 2012 it had become endemic in many more hospitals within the Italian 
healthcare system.1 
Managing the Spread
Israel provides an example of how prompt and concerted action might be 
managed. KPC was first identified as an issue in Israel in 2006, at which 
time surveillance indicated a significant and rapid escalation in the number 
of KPC isolates reported. The Israeli government responded swiftly to the 
threat, implementing mandatory measures to screen, isolate and decolonise 
individuals. A large team was mobilised to effect all aspects of the country’s 
infection prevention and control process. The speed and thoroughness of 
the response successfully reversed the increasing incidence of KPCs.2
Global travel remains a key issue in the global spread of these multi-resistant 
Gram-negative organisms as they are common in many of the countries that 
UK residents travel to. CROs could potentially be introduced into the UK 
through the arrival of colonised individuals, particularly those individuals who 
have previously been hospitalised in endemic countries, including visitors 
from abroad or residents returning to the UK following medical treatment 
abroad (including medical tourists) and armed forces personnel. Historically, 
many visitors come to the UK to visit friends and relations and may stay for 
extended periods. Many are elderly and may require healthcare both in their 
own country and the areas to which they are travelling. 
UK Incidence of CROs
Whilst the spread of infection within the UK has been linked to inter-
hospital transfers, the role of community carriage in promulgating infection 
remains uncertain: the precise number of overseas patients admitted to NHS 
hospitals is unknown as these data are not collected centrally, though it is 
conservatively estimated that there are many tens of thousands per year, 
many of whom may potentially carry multi-resistant organisms. Unpublished 
data provided by Public Health England indicates that from 2003 to 2012, 
more than 1,500 isolates of carbapenemase-producing organisms were 
identified in England. Analysis of the isolates shows that, while early cases 
were few and generally imported, since 2008 the number of isolates has 
increased and isolates now include those thought to be related both to 
importation and spread within England.3 
1 See Figure 1, Slide 8, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/Sharland_Part_1.ppt>.
2 L F Chen et al, ‘Overview of the epidemiology and the threat of Klebsiella pnuemoniae 
carbapenmenases (KPC) resistance, Infection and Drug Resistance (Vol. 5, 2012) pp. 
133–141. 
3 See Figure 1, Slide 18, in presentation available at <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/
assets/Sharland_Part_1.ppt>.
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The Research Agenda
Our current knowledge of even the basic epidemiology of multi-resistant 
bacteria is limited. Gaps include the duration of carriage of CROs within the 
human intestine; the relation between carriage and invasive disease; whether 
specific high-risk groups or individuals exist; and whether and how these 
might be targeted for screening to minimise the potential for transmission. If 
screening is to be undertaken as part of an infection prevention and control 
process, how should it be undertaken optimally? How effective is isolation 
and is decolonisation a feasible option? What is the cost effectiveness of the 
numerous potential interventions?
Currently, all elective or emergency admissions to the NHS are screened for 
MRSA via a nose swab, which has been relatively acceptable to patients. To 
determine carriage of organisms that are carried within the intestine requires 
the use of rectal swab. It is likely that these will be found to be significantly 
less acceptable to patients than nasal swabs and methods of improving the 
acceptability need to be developed. 
Summary
Concerted, strategic and harmonised action to tackle CROs is required 
across all areas – including prescribing and stewardship, surveillance and 
diagnostics – and across all professions from clinicians to policy-makers. 
Whilst universally acknowledged as good, the UK’s levels of infection 
prevention and control, and methods for screening and isolation, will need 
to be optimised and guidance adhered to if we are to minimise the potential 
for spread of CROs within the UK.
There is a need for focused research to enhance our understanding and 
provide cost-effective approaches to dealing with this serious threat. The UK 
has been effective in implementing changes that have driven down infections 
caused by MRSA and C difficile. As a priority, attention and research activity 
should now be refocused to address the rising threat of multi-resistant Gram-
negative infections, including CROs. This will be complicated and challenging: 
new initiatives by the Chief Medical Officer and the Department of Health 
are very welcome and are key to ensuring success in this area.
Professor Mike Sharland is a consultant in paediatric infectious diseases 
at St George’s Hospital, London, and professor of paediatric infectious 
diseases at St George’s, University of London. His research interests focus 
on optimising antimicrobial prescribing for children, antimicrobial resistance 
and healthcare associated infection; he has published around 200 papers 
in this area. He is chair of the UK Department of Health Expert Advisory 
Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare Associated Infection 
(ARHAI). Professor Sharland would like to thank Dr Jo Wallace of Public Health 
England who assisted in the preparation of this paper. 

VIII. The Sentinel Soldier
Group Captain A D Green
The public perception of the people who make up the military is that they are 
all young, fit and healthy and are representative of the civilian population in 
the UK. This is not necessarily true – the British Armed Forces have recruited 
extensively from overseas for many years, with the Gurkhas from Nepal and 
the Irish Regiments perhaps being the best-known examples. In fact, any 
individual from a Commonwealth country may join the services, and up to 5 
per cent of recruits may be from overseas. On occasions, the proportion has 
been even greater than this; in 2011, 7.9 per cent of the British Army were 
foreign nationals.1 Recruits may be fit on entry but go on to develop illness 
or injury during their service, so that many serving personnel have impaired 
immunity that makes them susceptible to infectious diseases. In addition, an 
increasing proportion of deployed personnel are drawn from Reserve Forces, 
some of whom will have increased risk factors for disease and will return to 
their civilian place of work after duty overseas. 
Military Travel
The armed forces go overseas for a variety of reasons, each of which carries 
particular risks for the acquisition of infectious diseases. Military activities 
include operational deployments up to and including warfare, which may be 
in conjunction with a variety of coalition or allied forces and in association 
with host-nation personnel. These may be as part of a formal international 
intervention by the United Nations or NATO, or as bilateral agreements with 
individual countries. Missions to support civilian populations range from 
evacuation of non-combatants from war zones to humanitarian work and 
disaster-relief operations. The Royal Navy maintains a maritime presence 
worldwide, with port visits forming an integral part of its role.
A key element of any force preparation is training, and there are well-
established overseas training locations in a number of hot and cold climates, 
as well as regular exercises held overseas.
In addition to formed units in operational and training missions, there are 
also large numbers of military personnel who travel as a part of small groups 
or alone. These include diplomatic staff, individuals seconded to foreign 
armed forces, specialist military groups such as special forces and weapons 
inspectors, and expeditions including adventurous training. 
In every situation, safe food and water supplies may be compromised, 
personnel may be exposed to arthropod and animal vectors of disease, 
1 Defence Analytical and Statistics Agency, UK Defence Statistics 2011 (Chapter 2, Table 
2.14). See <www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2011/c2/table214.php>.
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have limited access to medical care and be in close contact with local 
populations during times of heightened disease transmission. Each of these 
activities involves exposure to a different level of risk from that experienced 
by a civilian holiday-maker or businessman, and leads to the term ‘sentinel 
soldier’ reflecting the possibility of a novel disease appearing for the first 
time in this group.
Medical Issues
Bullets and bombs are often considered to be the greatest health threat 
to deployed military forces, but personnel are in fact far more likely to be 
incapacitated by infectious disease. Recent advances in medical care mean 
that death from these causes is far less likely today than it has been in the 
past, but the numbers of casualties overall still outnumber trauma cases by 
a factor of five to ten.2
Military personnel who become ill or are injured overseas will receive 
immediate medical care, but how and where this is delivered will depend 
on their circumstances. Large operational deployments will have full medical 
support, including immediate first aid if required, primary care, hospital care 
and aeromedical evacuation if required. Individuals on isolated detachments, 
on the other hand, may be entirely dependent on local healthcare facilities 
and/or will be repatriated to the UK by aeromedical evacuation if necessary. 
In 2010, there were just under 5,000 patients repatriated to the UK, of 
which more than 100 were intensive-care patients requiring Critical Care Air 
Support Team (CCAST) deployment and dedicated aircraft. Most, but not all, 
of these were trauma patients from the current conflict in Afghanistan.3
Severely injured battle-trauma patients are likely to be colonised or infected 
with organisms. This results from the heavy inoculation of environmental 
material at time of injury, either as a result of gunshot wounds or improvised 
explosive devices, auto-inoculation by their own microflora from gut or 
other organs, or healthcare associated infection (HAI). Without aggressive 
surgical management to remove dead and dying tissues and foreign 
material, the organisms present may become invasive and cause severe 
disease. Historically, the leading cause of death from trauma after the initial 
resuscitation was sepsis, and even with modern management techniques it 
remains a significant cause of late morbidity and mortality.4
2 M R Smallman–Raynor, A D Cliff, War Epidemics: an Historical Geography of Infectious 
Diseases in Military Conflict and Civil Strife, 1850–2000 (Oxford University Press, 
2004).
3 Ministry of Defence’s Op Herrick casualty and fatality tables. See <https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/op–herrick–casualty–and–fatality–tables>
4 E J Hutley, A D Green, ‘Infection in wounds of conflict – old lessons and new 
challenges’, J R Army Med Corps (Vol. 155, No. 4, December 2009) pp. 315–319.
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Trauma patents injured in Afghanistan are repatriated to the UK as soon 
as they have had immediately life-saving surgery and have been stabilised, 
which is usually within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Patients repatriated 
from other locations, such as civilian hospitals elsewhere in the world, may 
have been in-patients for many days or sometime weeks. Both scenarios 
raise the possibility of transfer of individuals with multi-resistant organisms 
– acquired from primary environmental exposure or HAI related to their 
hospital stay – into UK healthcare settings.
MDR Bacteria Imported by the Military
Within days of the start of the Iraq War in 2003, US military medical facilities 
that were treating local civilian casualties were reporting incidences of 
multi-resistant bacteria. These were predominantly related to Acinetobacter 
baumannii, which is an organism commonly isolated from hospitals worldwide 
and often noted to be resistant to a wide range of antimicrobial agents. Over 
the following months and years this organism in particular became widely 
reported as being problematic in military personnel, primarily in the US.5 
It has also been observed in injured personnel from other nations, though 
not to the same degree. The organism is regarded as being a low-grade 
pathogen, as it is commonly found colonising patients (present, but not 
causing disease) and only rarely progresses to infection in individuals with 
other pre-disposing factors for invasive disease (such as IV lines or ventilatory 
support).6 In common with other related bacteria, it has become important 
because on those occasions when therapy is indicated there are few available 
antimicrobial agents available. As such, it means that individuals who are 
identified as being colonised or infected are managed using infection control 
measures to prevent spread in the hospital environment to other, more 
susceptible patients.
In the UK, there have been regular admissions of military trauma patients 
colonised with A baumannii which has generally been identified at an early 
stage – the spread to other patients has been prevented by good infection 
control practices. However, there have been occasional outbreaks related to 
the breakdown of these practices, with spread from military personnel to 
civilian patients.7
5 CK Murray, ‘Epidemiology of infections associated with combat–related injuries in 
Iraq and Afghanistan’, The Journal of Trauma (Vol. 64, No. 3 Suppl, March 2008) pp. 
232–238. See <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18316967>. 
6 T L Stuart, M Mulvey, A E Simor, H C Tien, A Battad, G Taylor, J V Vayalumkal, C Weir, 
M Ofner, D Gravel, S Paton, ‘Acinetobacter baumannii in casualties returning from 
Afghanistan’, Canadian Journal of Infection Control (Vol. 22, No. 3, fall 2007) pp. 152–4.
7 A Jones, D Morgan, A Walsh, J Turton, D Livermore, T Pitt, A Green, M Gill, D Mortiboy, 
‘Importation of multi drug–resistant Acinetobacter spp infections with casualties from 
Iraq’, The Lancet Infectious Diseases (Vol. 6, No. 6, June 2006), pp. 317–8.
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MDR Bacteria and Current Operations: A Multinational Melting Pot
The current NATO mission in Afghanistan comprises fifty nations contributing 
personnel, which provides an opportunity for sharing of micro-organisms 
from many different parts of the world, particularly when operating in a 
harsh environment and sharing healthcare facilities. South Asia is also well 
recognised as being a reservoir for many multi-resistant infectious diseases in 
local populations for reasons that are not entirely clear, but may reflect both 
the unregulated use of antimicrobial agents for therapy and environmental 
selective pressure from saprophytic organisms.8
Examples of endemic micro-organisms with inherent multi-resistance include 
common gastrointestinal pathogens such as Salmonella species and Shigella 
flexneri,9 Mycobacterium tuberculosis,10 extended spectrum beta-lactamase-
producing E coli (ESBL) and methicillin-resistant S aureus (MRSA). Whilst NATO 
personnel have regularly acquired gastrointestinal infections, infections with 
the other organisms have been rare to date, which may reflect limited close 
contact with local populations that would facilitate transmission.
NATO partner nations often adopt different disease prevention strategies, 
and this may inadvertently lead to selection of multi-resistant strains of 
bacteria. For example, the US armed forces in Afghanistan are issued with 
field treatment packs that include broad-spectrum antimicrobial agents 
to be taken if they are injured.11 Such regimens are generally ineffective 
at reducing the incidence of infection and deliver low concentrations of 
antimicrobial agents to devitalised and heavily contaminated tissues, which 
in turn provides ideal conditions for the generation of resistance. A particular 
concern is the use at forward locations of injectable carbapenem agents, in 
a region where the appearance of novel multi-resistance in some bacteria 
poses a global threat.12
8 E M Wellington, A B Boxall, P Cross, E J Feil, W H Gaze, P M Hawkey, A A Johnson–
Rollings, D L Jones, N M Lee, W Otten, C M Thomas, A P Williams, ‘The role of the 
natural environment in the emergence of antibiotic resistance in Gram–negative 
bacteria’, The Lancet Infectious Diseases (Vol. 13, No. 2, February 2013), pp. 155–65. 
9 E J Threlfall, ‘Antimicrobial drug resistance in Salmonella: problems and perspectives 
in food– and water–borne infections’, FEMS Microbiology Reviews (Vol. 26, No. 2, June 
2002) pp. 141–148.
10 World Health Organization, ‘Global Tuberculosis Report 2012’. See <www.who.int/tb/
publications/global_report/gtbr12_main.pdf >
11 D R Hospenthal, C K Murray, R C Andersen, et al, ‘Guidelines for the prevention of 
infections associated with combat–related injuries’, Journal of Trauma (Vol. 71, No 2 
Suppl 2, August 2011), pp. 210–34. 
12 P McGann, M Millo, R Clifford, et al, ‘Detection of New Delhi Metallo–β–Lactamase 
(blaNDM–1) in Acinetobacter schindleri during routine surveillance’, Journal of Clinical 
Microbiology (Vol. 51, No. 6, June 2013), pp. 1942–1944 (published ahead of print, 
3 April 2013). See <http://jcm.asm.org/content/early/2013/03/29/JCM.00281–13.
abstract#aff–1>
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Military forces may also pose a threat to the host environment, rather than 
being at risk themselves. The increasing use of multinational forces across 
the world for disaster relief and peace-keeping operations means that fragile 
ecosystems may be exposed to novel infective agents. In 2010 in Haiti, an 
outbreak of cholera affected large numbers of internally displaced civilians 
following a major earthquake, with more than 7,600 dying. The subsequent 
investigation indicated that the likely source was a Nepalese military unit 
deployed to assist the Haitian population as part of a United Nations mission.13 
The organism involved was not highly drug resistant, but the case serves as 
an example of how easily infections that may have profound consequences 
can spread around the globe.
Infection Control
The threat posed by multi-resistant organisms during medical care of 
casualties on operational deployments means that infection control is 
critically important in all military medical facilities, including care at point of 
injury, medical evacuation from the battlefield, Role 3 care (Field Hospital), 
and strategic aeromedical evacuation to the UK. 
All British field hospitals such as that at Camp Bastion include a trained 
Infection Control Practitioner as part of their permanent manning, and 
clinical practices follow UK civilian best-practice whenever possible within 
operational constraints. The hospital is inspected at intervals by the UK Care 
Quality Commission, which has found the standards of infection control 
practice to be ‘exceptionally high’.14 A recent review of infection control at all 
NATO medical facilities in Afghanistan found the practices at Camp Bastion to 
be significantly better than at any other location.15
Most patients arrive at the receiving centre in the UK, at Queen Elizabeth 
University Hospital Birmingham, within forty-eight hours of injury. This is 
before any microbiological results from initial assessment at Camp Bastion 
are available and therefore all patients are managed as potentially colonised 
with multi-resistant bacteria. By careful isolation of these patients, the risk 
of transmission is minimised. Such policies have been refined over a decade 
of experience with such cases. 
In 2011, the UK government accepted more than fifty trauma casualties 
from the Libya conflict, who had been treated in a variety of hospitals in 
13 A Cravioto, C F Lanata, D S Lantagne, G B Nair, ‘Final report of the independent panel 
of experts on the cholera outbreak in Haiti’, United Nations, 4 May 2011. See <http://
www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN–cholera–report–final.pdf>
14 Care Quality Commission, ‘Defence Medical Services: A review of compliance with 
the essential standards of quality and safety’, June 2012. See <http://www.cqc.org.
uk/public/reports–surveys–and–reviews/reviews–and–studies/defence–medical–
services>
15 Personal communication between the author and C K Murray.
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the Mediterranean region. These cases were widely distributed across NHS 
hospitals to share the workload, but in common with casualties managed 
elsewhere in Europe, most were colonised with multi-resistant bacteria, 
which in turn could potentially have led to widespread distribution of the 
organisms within UK hospitals.16
Geopolitical Issues and Multi-resistant Bacteria
Infectious diseases have played a role in fashioning the development of 
societies throughout history, with effects ranging from a direct impact on 
civilian populations, such as the Black Death,17 to the limitation of human 
settlement by the geographical distribution of diseases such as malaria.18 In 
addition, they have influenced the course of many military campaigns, and 
in some cases changed the outcome of a conflict.19
Antimicrobial resistance may influence these effects. During the Rwandan 
Civil War in the 1990s, large numbers of refuges and internally displaced 
personnel were accommodated in temporary camps with limited water 
and sanitation. Outbreaks of bacillary dysentery were complicated by the 
appearance of a MDR strain of Shigella dysenteriae Type 1, which was 
resistant to all available therapies and associated with increased mortality 
in casualties.20
Resistance is also becoming more common in other pathogens associated 
with significant morbidity and mortality in developing countries. Examples 
include lower respiratory tract infections due to Streptococcus pneumoniae21 
and severe sepsis due to Neisseria meningitidis.22
The consequences of widespread drug resistance amongst bacteria that 
cause common and severe infections are significant. Many of the diseases 
16 K Koole, P M Ellerbroek, R Lagendijk et al, ‘Colonization of Libyan civil war casualties 
with multidrug–resistant bacteria’, Clinical Microbiology and Infection (Vol. 19, No. 7, 
July 2013), pp. 285–7 (e–published ahead of print).
17 P Slack, ‘The black death past and present. 2. Some historical problems’, Transactions 
of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, Vol. 83, No. 4, July–August 
1989), pp. 461–463.
18 R Carter, N Kamini, K Mendis, ‘Evolutionary and Historical Aspects of the Burden of 
Malaria’, Clinical Microbiology Reviews (Vol. 15, No. 4, October 2002), pp. 564–594.
19 M J Zapor, K A Moran, ‘Infectious diseases during wartime’, Current Opinion in 
Infectious Diseases (Vol 18, No. 5, October 2005), pp. 395–9.
20 S Kernéis, P J Guerin, L von Seidlein et al, ‘A Look Back at an Ongoing Problem: Shigella 
dysenteriae Type 1 Epidemics in Refugee Settings in Central Africa (1993–1995)’, PLOS 
ONE (Vol. 4, No. 2).
21 S J Schrag, B Beall, S Dowell, ‘Resistant pneumococcal infections: the burden of disease 
and challenges in monitoring and controlling antimicrobial resistance’, World Health 
Organization, 2002.
22 B Oppenheim, ‘Antibiotic Resistance in Neisseria meningitidis’, Clinical Infectious 
Diseases (Vol 24, No 1, 1997), pp. 98–101.
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predominantly affect children and young adults, which may in turn lead to 
changes in population demographics if infections with high mortality become 
refractory to therapy. Similar effects have been seen in societies where HIV 
is common, with the loss of large numbers of economically active adults 
consequently having a destabilising effect on society.23
Summary
The military has the same interest as civilian health authorities in controlling 
the spread of antimicrobial drug resistance. Treatment of infections on the 
battlefield will become more complex, both for trauma and infectious diseases 
as AMR increases; in addition, military patients may return multi-resistant 
organisms from overseas to their homeland. However, the increased use of 
multinational forces to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief means 
that they in turn might export novel bacteria to receptive environments. 
There also remains the potential destabilising effect of MDR on fragile 
societies, which may have unpredictable consequences.
Group Captain Andy Green trained at St George’s Hospital Medical School, 
London and joined the Royal Air Force in 1983. He is part of the National 
Institute for Health Research Surgical Reconstruction and Microbiology 
Research Centre (NIHR SRMRC) at Birmingham, where a series of active 
research programmes are examining the microbiological aspects of wounds 
in returning military trauma patients. He advises the Surgeon General on all 
aspects of infectious diseases and their control and has published more than 
ninety scientific articles.
23 T Barnett, A Whiteside, C Desmond, ‘The social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS in 
poor countries: a review of studies and lessons’, Progress in Development Studies (Vol. 
1, No. 2, April 2001) pp. 151–170.

IX. Social Technologies for Community Response 
to Epidemics
Chris Watkins and Jennifer Cole
The best defence against any disease is to not catch it. Technologies such as 
smartphones and online social networks offer new possibilities of collective 
response that can both help people to avoid catching a disease and, if they 
do catch it, to avoid passing it on. This principle is true for any epidemic but 
becomes increasingly important as the severity of the disease and number 
of cases increases or the efficacy of available treatments decreases.
While the issues discussed in this paper relate to outbreaks of serious 
infectious disease in general, and are not specific to those caused by or 
involving drug-resistant organisms, the issues covered are equally applicable 
to tackling AMR. Any outbreak of serious infectious disease that involved 
drug-resistance would be exacerbated by that resistance and, equally, the 
methods discussed to monitor emerging cases and contain the spread are 
just as applicable to non-pandemic resistant strains.
Studies of the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic1 show that US cities which 
implemented vigorous measures for public health and social distancing 
were measurably less affected than those that did not. Could today’s social 
media technologies enable an even more efficient public response than was 
possible in 1918? Could epidemic spread in the UK even be stopped with 
suitably co-ordinated community behavioural responses? 
Stopping an epidemic on a national scale is not an extreme point of view. 
People are generally healthy because conventional community behaviour – 
which can be something as simple as covering one’s mouth when coughing, 
using tissues and taking a day off work when feeling ill – stops many 
infectious diseases from spreading. What could be done to co-ordinate the 
temporary and reactive changes in community behaviour needed to halt a 
severe epidemic? 
If a severe pandemic broke out tomorrow, it is likely that ordinary people 
in the UK would want to make the fullest use of their digital devices to 
inform themselves about the disease and to get the latest information on 
the epidemic. They would use online social networking to spread news and 
1 Martin Bootsma, Neil Ferguson, ‘The effect of public health measures on the 1918 
influenza pandemic in US cities’, PNAS (Vol. 104, No. 8, April 2007) pp. 7588–7593; 
Richard Hatchett, Carter Mecher and Marc Lipsitch, ‘Public health interventions and 
epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic’, PNAS (Vol. 104, No. 18, April 
2007) pp. 7582–7587
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engage in discussion. They would use social networks to discover if any of 
their family, friends, colleagues and acquaintances were sick. It is likely that 
they would want the latest and most accurate information; that they would 
use every means available to them to get it; and that they would try to use 
this information to avoid catching the disease themselves. 
This paper will briefly discuss four technologies that could help empower a 
community to control an epidemic: 
1. Online social networking
2. Localisation and tracking using smartphones
3. Voted discussion systems
4. Online co-ordination of local community support.
Before considering possible technological tools, however, let us consider 
more carefully what the aim of preparedness planning should be. 
Pandemics: Mild and Severe
During a mild pandemic such as the 2009 H1N1 ‘Swine flu’ pandemic, life 
carries on as usual for the majority of people, but the health service may 
be critically overloaded. It is difficult to motivate effective mass community 
response because for most people, the disease is mild and regarded as a 
normal risk of life, particularly when the additional work going on within the 
NHS is largely invisible to anyone not directly affected – a situation commonly 
described as the ‘emergency planner’s dilemma’: handle the emergency 
well, and it can sometimes be perceived by outsiders as a fuss about nothing.
A fast-spreading pandemic of a severe disease, such as the 1918 outbreak, 
has not occurred within the living memory of UK citizens, and is entirely 
outside the experience of ordinary people. The societal consequences may 
be severe however, and many of them may be unforeseeable because of poor 
understanding of supply-chain disruption and the tipping points at which 
some teams and organisations become unable to function with reduced 
numbers. During the 2009–10 pandemic, much research was carried out 
on, for example, the effects on a company of a significant proportion of the 
accounts department being off sick simultaneously, particularly if temping 
agencies were similarly stretched and unable to make up any shortfalls; or 
at what levels of staff sickness a Police Air Support Unit would no longer be 
able to fly its helicopter. During a more serious epidemic, observation and 
prediction of such tipping points would become a great motivator for people 
to temporarily change their behaviour.
In making such considerations, there is a need to compare two distinct 
pandemic scenarios: 
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Case A: Mild pandemic disease, with effects only slightly more severe than 
typical influenza and which most people in the UK would accept as one of 
the normal risks of life. There would be little motivation for the majority of 
people to make a great effort to avoid it. 
Case B: Severe pandemic disease with rapid spread and substantial mortality. 
No such epidemic has occurred in the UK within living memory. Under such 
circumstances, large sections of the community might be more prepared 
to co-operate in extraordinary measures and make substantial behavioural 
changes to avoid and prevent epidemic spread. 
The pandemic preparedness plans recently refined by the Department of 
Health2 have been prepared with enormous care and, along with additional 
planning carried out through the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, they held up well during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which was 
broadly appropriate for the mild Case A. Should the UK be faced with a 
pandemic more similar to Case B, these plans would be used in conjunction 
with other Civil Contingencies Secretariat planning, in particular for mass 
casualties and mass fatalities,3 and would dovetail with more generic 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) planning for large-scale 
bioterrorism attacks. These plans generally focus on how to deal with large 
numbers of the sick and deceased. Less attention has been given to how, 
faced with a rapid and severe pandemic, a sufficiently aggressive plan to stop 
its spread could be developed. 
Current UK planning assumptions for R0 (the basic reproductive ratio) 
of a pandemic influenza are that it is likely to lie between 1.4 and 2.5.4 If 
community behaviour could temporarily change so that each person who 
caught the disease passed it on to one fewer person on average than would 
normally happen, this would help to suppress the epidemic and restrict it 
to a succession of local outbreaks. This might seem an absurdly optimistic 
goal – but digital technologies are vigorous. For example, when Wikipedia 
was launched in 2001, few people predicted that within a few years it 
would become the world’s largest encyclopaedia, that it would often be 
more accurate than traditional encyclopaedias, and that it would penetrate 
so widely into society that it would become normal to consult it during 
conversations in pubs.
2 UK Department of Health, ‘UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy 2011’, 10 November 
2011. See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/134747/dh_131040.pdf.pdf.
3 See as example London Resilience ‘London Mass Fatality Plan’ (Vol. 4, April 2014), 
<http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/archives/london–prepared–London–
Mass–Fatality–Plan–v4.pdf >.
4 UK Scientific Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee, 2009.
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Changing Community Behaviour
The above demonstrates how rapidly (and unexpectedly) society can change 
its behaviour when sufficient drivers are in place to encourage it to do so. 
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that an epidemic could be stopped 
if enough people changed their behaviour in reaction to it. The report from 
Discussion Group 1, later in this report, outlines factors that need to be 
considered when encouraging behavioural change, and it would also seem 
to be common sense that to induce a large number of people to change their 
behaviour, the following steps are needed:
• Set a goal that is really worth achieving. In a severe pandemic, the goal 
should be to stop a national epidemic so that the spread is restricted 
to small local outbreaks
• Communicate a clear and credible plan through well understood and 
tested communication channels 
• Provide necessary information and tools for people to co-operate in 
suppressing the epidemic. Information should include both health 
advice and real-time local and personalised news
• Encourage and facilitate open mass discussion, so that there is a 
rapid learning and dissemination of refinements of plan and of good 
practice as it is developed. 
This paper will now consider technologies for providing real-time information 
about an epidemic and personalised information about people’s risk. It will 
also mention a new technology that could be very useful for open discussion 
and debate. 
Online Social Networking
At present, the dominant online social network is Facebook; other widely used 
networks with slightly different characteristics are Google+ and FourSquare. 
Facebook is less than ten years old – it was only founded in 2004 – but it 
now has hundreds of millions of active users worldwide, including a majority 
of thirteen-to-thirty year-olds in the UK, which is an epidemiologically 
significant cohort. 
Facebook and other social networks accumulate a vast database of personal 
data about their users and most particularly on their users’ interactions: 
this database is known as the ‘social graph’. Data in the social graph can 
be mined to infer much about a person’s social contacts. For example, 
although individuals often may not physically meet their Facebook friends, 
the social graph contains physical addresses, workplaces, clubs, meetings, 
parties and other information that can allow physical meetings and potential 
infectious contacts to be inferred. One rich source of information on 
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infectious contacts is co-tagging is photographs: Professor Jon Crowcroft5 of 
Cambridge University’s Computer Science Laboratory has observed that if 
people are co-tagged in a photograph, then they physically met. Facebook 
has implemented face-recognition technology to give the option of tagging 
people in photographs automatically and many people use Facebook to 
record their lives in real time – a photograph may be taken and uploaded 
immediately. 
Facebook – and similar networks – are potentially important in epidemic 
control. For about a century, epidemiologists have posited a graph of 
infectious contacts through which a contagious disease spreads: now parts 
of this graph may be explicitly represented in the social graph of Facebook. 
This suggests that new methods of enabling people to assess their personal 
risk of infection are possible. Information can spread through an online social 
network faster than a disease can spread between people. If a person comes 
to know that some contacts of contacts of their regular friends have fallen 
sick, then they would have a personal incentive to react by reducing their 
social contacts for a while. If people ringing a flu helpline could be persuaded 
to inform their friends of their infected status by Facebook, this would be a 
rapid and effective way of spreading local news of increased infection risk. 
Suggestions such as these raise many technical, factual and ethical questions 
however, including:
• Does contagious disease tend to spread along links that can be 
accurately inferred from the social graph? 
• What would be the best technical mechanisms for helping the 
community inform itself about collective infection risk using the social 
graph? 
• What ethical and privacy issues would arise in assisting information 
spread on the social network? 
• What could be done to improve the accuracy of information spread 
through a social network? 
• Social networks are run by competitive commercial companies and 
funded by advertising. What roles would these commercial companies 
be willing to play during a pandemic emergency? 
These questions are hard – but there are potentially extraordinary benefits 
to be had from enabling human social networks to actively respond to an 
emerging disease as it attempts to spread. 
5 ‘D Querica, M Bodaghi, J Crowcroft, ‘Loosing “Friends” on Facebook’, <http://www.
cl.cam.ac.uk/~dq209/publications/websci_loosing.pdf >
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Smartphone Localisation and Tracking
There are more mobile phones in the UK today than there are people. An 
increasing percentage of these phones are smartphones, which are capable 
of running apps in the background throughout the day. There is intense 
research to make smartphones both location-aware and context-aware – 
that is, the phone should know where it is and what its user is currently 
doing. This mass ownership of smartphones gives the technical possibility 
of real-time monitoring of an epidemic as well as mass personalised public 
health interventions. 
Suppose that, when faced with an emergency, millions of people would 
be willing to co-operate in doing whatever was necessary to control the 
epidemic. To do this, they might be willing to allow uses of their personal 
data that in normal times would be considered unacceptable breaches of 
privacy. What might be done? How might their smartphones be used in a 
collectively productive way to control the epidemic?
A natural technological possibility would be for people, en masse, to record 
their movements on their smartphones. This could be done in a way that 
respects privacy: people could download an application that would run on 
their phone in the background, and which would record their movements 
in detail, but in an encrypted file. This encrypted file could be uploaded to a 
central server where it could then be read – but it would not be readable on 
the smartphone itself. The upload of the file should be at the phone user’s 
discretion. The movements of all mobile phones are tracked anyway by the 
phone base stations, to a precision of roughly 100 metres, and the records 
are kept: users apparently do not object to this even in normal times. But a 
smartphone running an application could track its position more precisely 
and more frequently. 
One natural localisation technology to use would be for the phone to record 
the identities of the Wi-Fi networks it can currently detect, together with 
their signal strengths. The phone could passively record this information 
at frequent intervals, and then store it in encrypted form; at the user’s 
discretion, the encrypted trail could be uploaded to a trusted site that 
would decrypt the trail, and collate the trails of many people, to provide an 
analysis of potentially infectious contacts. Again, no information would be 
readable from the phone itself: the encrypted information would be given to 
a central site at each user’s discretion. The pattern of signal strengths of the 
currently detectable Wi-Fi networks is not directly interpretable as a precise 
geographical location – but it is a spatially rapidly variable signal that can 
be used to tell if two phones are close to each other. Most importantly, it 
works particularly well indoors: under favourable conditions, if two phones 
can detect similar Wi-Fi strengths, they are likely to be in the same room. 
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In this way, those who volunteered to record their trails of movement could 
do so. If a sufficient number of people chose to do this – and in a crisis, many 
people might – then the movements and close contacts of large numbers 
of people could be tracked in unprecedented detail. If any person fell sick, 
potential contacts could be traced in real time. A database of a large number 
of contact trails could enable the modes of transmission of the disease to be 
established rapidly and comprehensively. Another method of mapping the 
contact network is the ‘FluPhone’ project.6
Voted Discussion Forums
During a severe pandemic, infection control policies and public health advice 
should be discussed as widely, as fully and as productively as possible. Advice 
should, of course, be broadcast from experts to the public, but this is not 
the only direction in which information should flow. Many people will have 
valid questions about the expert advice and others may come up with useful 
suggestions of their own, which deserve to be broadcast and discussed in 
turn. Some people may misunderstand the expert advice, and others will 
doubt it and will need to be persuaded to follow it. There will be many 
situations and circumstances that the expert advice as given will not cover. 
In short, during a pandemic emergency, there would be a need for rapid, 
decentralised, high-quality discussions on many issues.
Ordinary people, of course, would discuss the pandemic emergency in every 
possible way, but certain types of online forum would be particularly valuable. 
Issues of personal health and infection are highly emotive, and some people 
will wish to express strongly held opinions that may be eccentric, irrational, 
unhelpful or plain wrong. A simple public forum, such as a typical newspaper 
comments column, tends to be swamped by low-value comments whenever 
emotive issues are discussed. In contrast, voted discussion forums such as 
Reddit and Slashdot are a subtly powerful technology that allows users to 
moderate discussions in a distributed way, by voting comments up or down, 
or by providing more structured moderation (as in Slashdot). 
The key feature of a voted discussion forums is that user moderation 
determines how comments are displayed. In Reddit, for example, down-
voted comments go to the end of the list. This user-moderation – the ‘voting’ 
– has a powerful effect in improving the general quality of discussion, and 
in rapidly identifying those comments that are well thought out and well 
expressed. Comments that are poorly expressed, incoherent, or which 
present tiresome or inane points of view are typically voted down. The 
almost magical effect of moderation from the mass of users is that people 
6 Eiko Yoneki, ‘Fluphone study: virtual disease spread using haggle’, pp 65–66, paper 
presented to the 6th ACM conference on challenged networks, 2011. See http://www.
cl.cam.ac.uk/~ey204/pubs/2011_CHANTS.pdf.
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posting comments have an incentive to think and write better: nobody wants 
their comment to be voted down.
Voted forum technology is a key element in the new ‘massively open online 
courses’ (MOOCs) provided by companies such as Coursera and Udacity: in 
some of these, tens of thousands of learners are actively involved online and 
they communicate effectively in online discussion forums. Students answer 
each other’s questions – and questions that need the instructor’s comments 
are voted up for their attention. In this way, a large community of learners 
can share a common, interactive instructional experience. Voted discussion 
forums are one possible model for mass communication of infection control 
advice. In a pandemic emergency, existing forums would be intensively used 
in this way – but planning could ensure that expert advice is fed into the 
discussion from an early stage. 
Non-pharmaceutical interventions can be more than simple interventions by 
the health authorities – community-wide responses also have an important 
role to play. Well-designed forums for active community-wide discussion 
could help the community itself to adopt and refine its non-pharmaceutical 
responses to the epidemic.
Distributed Community Support
Distributed community support has so far received little academic attention, 
but it could be important. During an epidemic, a local community (the 
residents of a single tower block, for example) might wish to organise mutual 
assistance. They might wish to assist in household quarantine by arranging 
to do the shopping for people who might be infectious. They might wish to 
discuss and co-operate in many ways, such as organising volunteers. They 
might wish to do all this without having a physical mass meeting – for very 
good reason, as such a mass meeting is likely to ensure the infection would 
spread. Online tools could help to ensure that all meetings were virtual. 
Protocols and guidance for communities in organising mutual assistance 
and recruiting volunteers under such circumstances would be useful public 
health information. 
Summary
This paper has suggested that preparedness planning for a severe pandemic 
should have the aggressive and ambitious goal of stopping the epidemic on a 
national scale. Less ambitious plans are defeatist. The best defence against a 
new, severe disease is not to catch it and planning should emphasise changing 
community behaviour to stop transmission during and epidemic. Further 
research into how communities behave with regard to infectious diseases 
would be extremely beneficial. It would be reasonable to assume that 
people will be willing to change their behaviour most effectively in response 
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to a well-presented plan for stopping an epidemic, rather than a plan that 
implicitly assumes that an epidemic can only be somewhat mitigated.
In preparing such a plan, digital communications technology should be used to 
the fullest extent possible. Research should be done on preparedness planning 
using digital communications technologies for real-time epidemiology, 
automatic contact tracing and providing personalised estimates of infection 
risk, as well as for promoting efficient public discussion and for enabling local 
co-ordination of volunteers. Research is also needed to smooth the technical, 
ethical, practical and legal problems that will inevitably arise. 
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7 Sebastian Funk, Erez Gilad, Chris Watkins and Vincent Jansen, ‘The spread of 
awareness and its impact on epidemic outbreaks’, PNAS (Vol. 106, No. 16, 2009) p. 
6872–6877.

Discussion Groups
During the afternoon, the conference broke down into focused discussion 
groups, each comprising between ten and twenty delegates. The outcomes 
of these discussion forums are presented over the following pages.
Discussions were without attribution. The information presented here 
seeks to represent the discussions that took place; there is not always 
robust academic referencing to support the views offered, but it has been 
assumed that if comments made by individual delegates were not credible 
they would have been rejected by the other members of that group during 
the discussions. Views presented are therefore assumed to be broadly 
supported by the majority of those present. Where possible, transcripts of 
the discussion forums were distributed to the participants during the editing 
process for further comment and clarification.
There was, inevitably, some crossover of subject matter and topic discussion 
between one group and the next, and where this has occurred, comments 
have been amalgamated under one heading to avoid repetition. For example, 
comments on the importance of accurate, point-of-care diagnostics raised 
in the discussion forum ‘Changing Behaviour in Antibiotic Prescribing’ 
have been amalgamated with the discussion forum ‘Improving Diagnostic 
Techniques’, and comments on the role of the media raised in discussions 
regarding barriers to implementing AMR strategy have been amalgamated 
under the heading ‘Communicating the AMR Message’.

Discussion Group 1: Changing Behaviour in 
Antibiotic Prescribing
Chair and Rapporteur: Jennifer Cole
Key Issues and Challenges
Behavioural
• Systematic ways to eliminate overprescribing need to be built in to 
the NHS
• Consultants need to take the lead in encouraging young doctors to 
keep abreast of the latest thinking, policy and guidelines on antibiotic 
prescribing and stewardship
• Patients need to be better educated on when antibiotics should be 
prescribed and why, in certain cases, there are good reasons for 
withholding them
• The ways in which ‘champions’ and ‘early adopters’ of behavioural 
change emerge and influence others needs to be better understood
• There needs to be a systematic review of which health education 
campaigns have been most successful in the past, and why.
Technical
• There needs to be greater consistency in the way infection data is 
collected
• There needs to be better data collection on the reason(s) why 
antibiotics have been prescribed, particularly where it is subsequently 
identified that infection is not present
• Rapid diagnostic techniques, that can rule out infection more quickly 
and which can give results at point of care (including at the GPs 
surgery or the hospital bedside), need to be developed.
Significantly reducing the quantity of antibiotics prescribed in the UK depends 
on changing the behavioural patterns of two distinct groups: those who are 
prescribing the antibiotics (i.e. doctors and other healthcare professionals) 
and those to whom the antibiotics are being prescribed (i.e. patients). Adult 
care and neonatal care were discussed separately at the conference, as 
there are significant differences inherent to the use of antibiotics for each 
group. The discussions from both age-specific groups have been combined 
in the report, however, as there is sufficient overlap of the challenges and 
suggested solutions to warrant this.
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Reasons Why Antibiotics are Overprescribed
Doctors overprescribe antibiotics for a number of reasons, which include, 
but are not limited to:
• ‘Just in case’ – when the doctor is not immediately sure whether the 
infection is viral or bacterial, or whether infection is present at all. 
Prescribing antibiotics in such cases ensures the patient’s condition 
does not deteriorate if bacterial infection is present
• ‘Keeping the patient happy’ – patients often expect to be given 
‘something’ if they have gone to the trouble of seeking medical advice 
and help. Antibiotics may be prescribed even if the doctor is aware 
they will have no effect
• ‘As protection (prophylaxis)’ – when patients are undergoing 
procedures such as chemotherapy or surgery, that leave them more 
prone to infection. In such cases, the antibiotics offer protection 
against the risk of infection rather than treating existing infections.
All of the above are widespread reasons why antibiotics are overprescribed. 
Such practices have built up over the past sixty years because historically, 
antibiotics have been readily available and relatively cheap, and they have 
relatively few side effects. In other words, there have been relatively few 
disadvantages to prescribing antibiotics to a patient, even if that patient 
does not need them. By contrast, the risk factors associated with not 
prescribing antibiotics to a patient who does need them can be high and, 
in extreme circumstances, may even prove fatal. Behaviour has, therefore, 
understandably been heavily weighted in favour of erring on the side of 
prescription. The increasing prevalence of AMR unbalances the current 
equilibrium, however, with the added complication that the increased (and 
increasing) risks now associated with prescribing are to the community as 
a whole and to the future efficacy of antibiotic therapies; on a case-by-case 
basis, the risks associated with prescribing or not prescribing antibiotics to an 
individual patient at a particular point in time has not significantly changed.
Determining Risk Thresholds
Antibiotics are often administered on very low risk thresholds (for example, 
as discussed in Chapter V, between an estimated 90 and 99 per cent of 
neonates treated with antibiotics do not have an infection). Nonetheless, a 
level of risk does exist even where it is very low, and one of the key challenges 
to re-evaluating the thresholds is the lack of available evidence on the effects 
and outcomes of withholding antibiotics, temporarily or permanently, to 
the low(er) risk patients. Without such evidence, it is difficult for healthcare 
professionals to feel confident in judging when it is safe not to prescribe 
antibiotics at all, to delay prescribing antibiotics until the presence of infection 
has been (more strongly) confirmed, or to give a very narrow-spectrum drug. 
An additional challenge is that any such studies that might be proposed are 
likely to have difficulty gaining ethics committee approval.
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Another difficult issue is how long the course of antibiotics, once prescribed, 
needs to be taken for before it is safe to stop: either because the infection has 
been treated successfully; because the time has passed when the suspected 
infection, if present, would have become apparent and it is therefore 
safe to assume it is not present; or because the infection has cleared up 
independently of the antibiotics. An example was given of patients with a 
urinary tract infection (UTI) who were given antibiotics but told to wait a day 
before starting to take the drugs. When the patients returned for further 
treatment and consultation, half of those who had been prescribed the 
antibiotics had never taken them, but there was no difference in outcomes 
between those who did and those who did not. There was a strong feeling 
within the discussion groups that there is a need for better collection of data 
relating to cases such as this, and better interrogation and analysis of such 
data to help build better understanding of, and prescribing guidelines on, 
the appropriate duration of treatment. In some cases, five, six or seven day 
regimens are prescribed, when, in the words of one delegate, ‘[the infection] 
might have cleared up earlier – sometimes with a single dose’.
The above issues lead to particular challenges in neonatal care. Neonates are 
very vulnerable to infections, which can take hold very quickly and this drives 
even greater caution and ‘just in case’ behaviour than in adult care. Close 
observation as an alternative to administering antibiotics, while further 
symptoms do or do not appear, puts a huge burden of responsibility on the 
healthcare professional tasked with making the observations. Symptoms can 
be missed, particularly as the baby is not able to describe how it feels, and in 
such cases the consequences could be fatal. This is particularly problematic 
in the current economic environment when staff time and resources are 
extremely stretched.
Healthcare professionals are concerned about being blamed for ‘getting 
it wrong’ if they miss infections, particularly in the modern ‘blame-and-
compensation’ culture where there is little tolerance for error. This inhibits 
potential early adopters of suggested new behaviour from coming forward 
to act as influencers and champions to their peer group. Personal fears based 
on actual experience also lead to a lack of willingness to take risks; seeing one 
patient die because an infection has been missed is likely to increase over-
caution to ensure the same mistake is not made again. The above barriers 
result in staff tending to focus on their individual patients to the detriment 
of the bigger picture. Neonatal vulnerability means that hospital staff and 
management, particularly in Special Care Baby Units and Neonatal Intensive 
Care Units, are particularly reluctant to change what they are comfortable 
with and what they know works.
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Building Confidence in Changing Behaviour
The key to overcoming the concerns expressed above is better understanding 
of the outcomes and consequences of reducing antibiotic use and of 
withholding antibiotics in certain situations. The more confident the 
healthcare professional is that withholding antibiotics will have no serious 
adverse effect on their patient, the more willing they are likely to be to 
change their behaviour. Quantitative and qualitative data on case studies in 
which antibiotics have been withheld, with no detrimental effect on patient 
outcome, will help to build this confidence.
There is, however, a marked lack of studies of this type and a corresponding 
lack of data. While it is scientifically and technically possible to collect data on 
the outcomes of withholding or delaying antibiotic therapies, there are serious 
ethical issues attached to doing so, and this makes studies to determine safety 
or otherwise of changes in procedure very difficult to undertake. What data 
there are tend to be either decades old, from before antibiotics were widely 
available (are therefore also before medical technology was as advanced as 
it is today) or from developing countries where access to antibiotics may not 
be available at all (and therefore the data does not show what happened if 
antibiotics are withheld for a day or a week, but what happens if antibiotics 
are never administered). One delegate remarked that the result of this is 
that: ‘You have the situation where nobody gets antibiotics or everyone gets 
a broad-spectrum drug. It’s difficult to find studies that look only at cases 
where you are sure that the patient is given the right treatment for the right 
infection, and then you look at the outcomes’. She further remarked that it 
was difficult to find data on studies conducted in countries which have ‘good’ 
(i.e. modern Western-standard) medical care. Her remarks were made in 
relation to care of elderly patients with UTI infections, but the group agreed 
that the principle applies universally.
The Lack of Useful Data
Another challenge is that there is very little data collected on cases where 
antibiotics are administered but no infection is then identified, even 
though such data may help to understand why the decision to prescribe 
was inappropriate. There is very little questioning of why antibiotics are 
administered in such situations, or of what might have caused the sign/
symptom that was attributed to possible infection once infection is ruled 
out. Too few healthcare professionals see the original misdiagnosis in such 
cases as an issue. 
Currently, there is no standardised way of collecting data on infection. 
There are no defined metrics that are universally accepted for measuring 
the outcomes of antimicrobial stewardship programmes, nor any consensus 
on how prescribing or clinical information and resistance data is defined. 
Should it be the number of patients on antibiotics or daily doses per 100 
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patient admissions, for example? At present, reviewing such data requires 
a significant amount of time spent looking back over patient records; staff 
carrying out such checks would need to get feedback quickly that would 
prove that what they are doing is making a difference (or at least not making 
things worse).
Better antibiotic stewardship might also be encouraged by increasing 
awareness of the disadvantages of overprescribing and by encouraging 
overprescription to be actively challenged. Managers and colleagues need to 
be encouraged to ask questions such as: ‘Why were antibiotics administered 
[in this case]? What had actually caused the sign/symptom that you thought 
was due to infection?’, and the reasons recorded so that they can be easily 
analysed. Professionals need to understand why overuse is an increasingly 
important issue.
The discussion groups felt that small amounts of funding for short pilot 
studies, to be undertaken by staff willing to instigate new behaviour, would 
be very useful; as little as £10,000–£20,000 for studies lasting three to six 
months was suggested. These pilot studies could be used quickly to develop 
and test new practices in one healthcare facility and then push this out to 
others. This was seen as being potentially more valuable than long, academic 
studies which may take four to five years to yield results, as the short studies 
could be used to ‘test’ if a theory is worth exploring further. This type of 
funding is currently difficult to obtain, but many felt it can have the most 
practical results, particularly if it could be awarded directly after new policy 
and guidelines are issued to help support early adopters of suggested new 
behaviours.
The Need for an AMR Public Health Campaign
‘Getting the AMR message out’ is a key challenge. Healthcare professionals 
and patients need to accept that AMR is a significant-enough issue that 
it requires a fundamental change in traditional prescription practices. 
However, it can be very difficult to get busy professionals to read literature 
on antibiotic prescribing and to keep up-to-date with current policy and 
guidance. An e-learning module may have more effect than written material, 
as may taught seminars (although consultants and senior doctors would 
have to make attendance a priority, not leave attendance to choice).
The campaign around the most recent (2012) European Antibiotics Awareness 
Day (EAAD) was considered to have been ‘rather insular’, due to a general 
lack of investment/interest in AMR. There had been a more significant push 
in 2011, when AMR was tied to World Health Day; but interest in EAAD, 
which happens annually in November, has been negligible in other years.
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The over-use of antibiotics requires a high-profile campaign along the lines of 
the ‘Clean Your Hands’ campaign, which successfully changed behaviour and 
had a significant impact on both MRSA and swine flu transmission rates. This 
shows that where there is sufficient will, an appropriate change in behaviour 
can follow.
Peer pressure, as well as the message itself, played an important part in 
the ‘Clean Your Hands’ campaign, and caused a tipping point at which new 
behaviour became so acceptable, and the old behaviour so unacceptable, 
that junior doctors and nurses felt confident in challenging senior colleagues 
on non-compliance. Such a tipping point could be particularly relevant to 
antibiotics prescribing: many of the delegates in the discussion forums had 
examples of where they, or colleagues, felt that a prescribing decision had 
been questionable but that they had lacked confidence in tackling more senior 
colleagues on their behaviour. Within neonatal care, there is a noticeable 
split between midwives, who are strongly in favour of reducing antibiotic 
use, and doctors and pharmacists, who appear more reluctant. One delegate 
recounted a discussion she had had with two of her hospital’s pharmacists 
about how they were actively looking at ways to avoid implement NICE 
Guideline 1491, including not reducing the drug dosage because ‘our way is 
fine’. This observation is consistent with experience of the ‘Clean Your Hands’ 
campaign: doctors were less compliant than nurses with the campaign’s 
messages. 
The behaviour of middle-ranking doctors in particular is seen as being 
challengingly ‘ingrained’. At medical schools, deaneries are starting to 
recognise over-prescribing and to address the issue. Over the last decade, 
younger doctors have become much better informed about antibiotic 
prescribing and use, and senior doctors who have significant teaching roles 
are also being reached through this process. Medical training in microbiology 
and infection control is still seen as ‘patchy and piecemeal’ around UK medical 
schools, however, and there is a need for greater standardisation. Targeting 
medical students now so that good practices are embedded for the future 
should be a priority.
Different demographics may need to be targeted differently; older doctors 
need to be encouraged to change bad habits, medical students need to be 
encouraged not to adopt them, and different groups may react better to 
different delivery routes and messaging platforms; a mixed approach may 
prove to be the most effective. Identifying staff who are willing to act as 
advocates to encourage uptake of new behaviour is key to developing a 
more practical approach. 
1  ‘Antibiotics for early–onset neonatal infection: antibiotics for the prevention and 
treatment of early–onset neonatal infection’, see <http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG/
Wave23/7>.
Conference Report 83
Evaluating Previous Public Health Campaigns 
Changing behaviour to address AMR challenges would benefit from a strong 
public health campaign aimed at medical professionals and patients. In 
planning such a campaign, it would be useful to have a good understanding 
of which public health campaigns have worked well in the past, which have 
been less successful, and the reasons why. There are important lessons 
to be learned from a number of past public health campaigns, aimed at 
both healthcare professionals (e.g. hand-washing in hospitals to reduce 
MRSA transmission) and at the general public (e.g. smoking, AIDS). A 
better understanding of public attitudes towards vaccination programmes, 
including reasons for the low uptake of seasonal flu vaccines amongst some 
groups and the negative perception of vaccines such as MMR, would also 
help to inform future planning. This suggests that a systematic review of 
public health campaigns is needed.
Within this, it would also be valuable to assess how attitudes to health 
information have changed over time. During the 1950s, the public tended 
to be more deferential to government and believed ‘doctor knows best’, 
whereas today there can be more skepticism over the truth of messages 
coming from central government and more of a desire to research 
information on the internet. The way this affects public health campaigns 
needs to be better understood. In particular, what drives public perceptions 
of health risk is not necessarily well known, nor are the reasons why the 
public react in a way that can seem illogical to healthcare professionals – for 
example, one of the demographic groups most opposed to the MMR vaccine 
is university educated women, so the issue is not due to lack of education or 
language barriers. It would be useful to understand if some health opinions, 
such as taking an anti-MMR stance, are used as a ‘badge of belief/identity’ 
by certain groups so that targeting these groups, as well as individuals, might 
be advantageous.
Negative Messages
Negative imagery in public education campaigns is hard-hitting and can be 
the most effective, particularly when combined with peer pressure. Anti-
smoking campaigns showing cancer tumours, for example, and anti drink-
drive adverts that show crash victims, have a strong impact on the public. 
Incorporating negative messages and imagery into an AMR campaign, such 
as by highlighting the links between antibiotics and childhood asthma, or 
antibiotics and childhood obesity, could help to encourage parents to accept 
antibiotics being withheld; empirical evidence comparing the health risk of 
withholding the antibiotics with the health risk from administering them 
would help both the professional and public understanding of this, and 
would help to determine where risk thresholds should and do lie. 
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Changing the attitude of the population is as important as changing the 
behaviour of individuals. There is a need to identify and work towards tipping 
points where behavioural change starts to take hold and become the norm, 
and to better understand the drivers of these macro-level changes. This 
could lead to certain groups feeling a sense of ownership and responsibility 
in seeing certain changes implemented and becoming champions of the 
message to the wider population. There is a potential role here for charitable 
or philanthropic organisations in tackling AMR, and perhaps even an ‘AMR-
UK’ style charity on the model of Cancer Research UK, which has been highly 
effective in channelling money into cancer research. Such a charity may help 
to drive funding towards research that there is little incentive for profit-
driven pharmaceutical companies to invest in. 
Only a small investment would be required to gauge public opinion. 
Commissioning a poll to evaluate the effectiveness of awareness campaigns 
would be a good use of money, as would a short study to explore the best 
media outlets and the best means of engaging the public interest. A two-
year study, first looking retrospectively at previous campaigns, and then at a 
new targeted information campaign, would be a sensible approach.
Systematic Support for Behavioural Change
Changing behaviour is not just about the message, however: it requires 
processes to be built into systems that encourage and enable people to 
choose to accept the message and to take appropriate action. For example, 
if the message is that antibiotics should not be prescribed for every cough 
and cold, then they should not be readily available in every hospital drug 
cupboard. Similarly, drug charts and documentation should be designed to 
encourage uptake of new behaviours: if a doctor is prescribing antibiotics in 
the absence of a red flag from the NICE Guidelines list, and in the presence 
of only one clinical indictor or risk factor (and therefore is acting against 
the recommendations of the guideline), they should be expected to list and 
explain the reason for this in the documentation. If a significant percentage 
of their prescribing decisions go against the recommendations of the 
guideline, they need to be questioned by senior management and perhaps 
even a central watchdog body. 
What might appear to be relatively minor or irrelevant issues can affect 
antibiotic stewardship quite profoundly. For example, on which day of the 
week a patient starts their course of antibiotics can be important. A patient 
starting a course on a Thursday will almost inevitably continue to take the 
drug over the weekend, whereas it might have been possible to stop the 
treatment after only a day or so had the course started earlier.
There is a huge amount of information available on prescribing practices 
but no standard way of measuring how behaviour is affected by it; some 
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hospitals and health trusts measure changes in prescribing following new 
literature and guidance, but others do not. There is a need to define clear 
strategies on implementation of new guidance, and to standardise the data 
to be collected as well as the way in which they should be collected. This 
will enable better assessment of stewardship programmes, not just in terms 
of prescribing but also in terms of clinical and microbial outcomes. Results 
should be fed back to a central point to help build evidence relating to the 
behavioural change itself, and the patient outcomes resulting from it.
Changing the Behaviour of Patients
Patients, as well as doctors, need to be encouraged to change behaviour and 
to understand when they should and should not expect to be prescribed 
antibiotics so that they do not feel annoyed with their doctor when antibiotics 
are withheld (and may also be better able to challenge a prescription they 
feel is unnecessary). Changing patient expectations about their treatment 
is vital. Doctors should not be afraid to admit to patients that they are 
unsure whether or not the patient has an infection; whether the infection is 
bacterial or viral; and to discuss options and risks of delaying treatment until 
the diagnosis is more certain. 
Managing people’s expectations of the time for recovery from illness and 
the effectiveness of medical intervention is a crucial factor in encouraging 
them not to demand additional medicines from their doctor. Explaining that 
choosing not to take additional medicines will have long-term benefits to the 
wider population may also help them to make the best decisions.
Information, given at the point-of-care, about the side effects both directly 
and indirectly affecting the patient is also important. Being honest about the 
links between neonatal antibiotic exposure and childhood conditions such as 
asthma and atopic dermatitis might help to explain stewardship programmes 
to parents.
Public education campaigns that include the public as well as medical 
professionals are essential to bringing down antibiotic use.
Rapid Diagnostic Techniques
Rapid diagnostic techniques that are able to quickly identify whether infection 
is present and what particular infection is present would help to reduce the ‘just 
in case’ nature of prescribing by increasing the certainty that an infection is of is 
not present; this would be particularly valuable in neonatal care. The discussion 
groups felt that more research into biomarkers that indicate quickly whether an 
infection is present is needed in particular.
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Research Topic Suggestions
1. In light of the new NICE Guideline 149 on Neonatal Infection, which 
is intended to reduce the unnecessary administration of antibiotics 
to neonates, short monitoring pilot projects in one or more hospitals 
over the next twelve months to record information on the cases where 
previously antibiotics might have been administered but withholding 
them is now recommended, to record whether there was any adverse 
outcome associated with withholding them, what (if any) this was, 
and what was the actual cause of the Clinical Indicator or Risk Factor 
listed in the NICE Guideline. 
2. Short studies that gather and analyse statistics relating to the 
likelihood of outcomes, and severity of outcomes, could help to build 
confidence in new behaviours [e.g. in 2,000 instances of this clinical 
indicator, only 5 per cent will be caused by infection. Of babies first 
treated with antibiotics at four hours after onset of clinical indicator, 
survival rate is 100 per cent, after eight hours it is 100 per cent, at 
twenty-four hours it is 100 per cent, at seventy-two hours it is 98 per 
cent, and so on].
3. Conduct a systematic review of past public health campaigns to 
suggest what messages, and which delivery methods, may best 
inform an AMR awareness campaign and campaigns to reduce the 
use of antibiotics. 
4. A study to determine the link between neonates born following 
maternal hyperthermia in labour (where the hyperthermia might be 
consequence of vasodilation secondary to epidural analgesics rather 
than infection) and the administration of antibiotics on suspicion of 
infection.
Discussion Group 2: Communicating the AMR 
Message
Chair and Rapporteur: Ian Cameron
Key Issues and Challenges:
• The most effective communication strategy for AMR messages is likely 
to be one that uses a mixture of traditional and new media
• Celebrity campaigners will help to engage the public and promote the 
message
• Social media can be used to counter incorrect or misleading newspaper 
stories
• Large companies that understand social marketing well, such as 
supermarket chains and large pharmaceutical companies, could be 
useful partners in any campaign
• Social media can be harnessed to provide real-time information on 
emerging diseases and disease spread.
Successful communication strategies depend on both the content of the 
message and its delivery mechanism. Once a message is sent, it has to be 
received, read and believed. The recipient has to decide to act on it and be 
supported in their decision to act. This is the same regardless of whether the 
message is communicated via traditional broadcast or print media, online 
or social media or by word of mouth. As different demographic groups 
access and take notice of different media platforms in different ways, the 
most effective communication strategy is likely to be a mixed approach using 
old and new media, local and national media, trade and general media and 
personal messaging from, for example, GPs, the NHS and celebrity campaign 
supporters. There are advantages and disadvantages to all. 
Understanding the sources from which patients derive information is 
particularly important in enabling them to make informed decisions. 
Information must come from an informed and trusted source. Experience 
from other areas of resilience, in particular flood messaging, shows that local 
newspapers and local radio (and their associated websites) are trusted more 
than the national media. A personal contact, such as a patient’s own GP, 
is likely to be more influential than the NHS; a GP handing over a leaflet 
as if they are personally recommending it will make a difference to how 
the patient assimilates the information. The public is also more likely to 
take messages from local media than to go directly to the Department of 
Health or NHS websites; the latter are more likely to be consulted for further 
information, however, so ways to drive the public to them will be beneficial. 
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In the US, community resilience campaigns are run in association with major 
sports clubs and the supermarket giant Walmart. Large sports stadia and 
supermarkets are seen as key centres of the local community, places which 
everyone uses and which can help to convey messages to large numbers 
of people and to most demographic groups. Such an approach might 
work equally well in the UK, particularly as supermarkets are very adept 
at sophisticated marketing campaigns and may be able to lend expertise 
to the development and communication strategy of a campaign under 
corporate and social responsibility programmes. Drug companies use social 
marketing to great effect and may be willing to help an AMR campaign as 
part of corporate responsibility even if they are less interested in investing in 
research into new antibiotics.
With respect to engaging traditional newspaper media in AMR campaigns, 
the main challenge will be that good news does not (always) sell papers: 
media coverage may tend towards alarmist or negative stories. For example, 
there is a danger that the media might try to link the spread of drug-resistant 
diseases such as tuberculosis to immigrants or immigrant populations, 
suggesting a racist undercurrent that could make the broader population 
less willing to engage.
If engaged properly, the media can be used to good effect as a conduit 
for distributing public information, while negative mainstream media 
impressions can be reversed by spreading alternate messages through social 
media. More novel outlets, such as the online game ‘Pandemic’, can also be 
used to educate the public by teaching the importance of conservatism in 
drug prescribing and promoting the importance of research to find effective 
drugs. Computer games that help to get the message to younger people may 
help to instill a culture of more appropriate use of drugs at an early age. 
Television, radio and newspaper audiences are no longer passive. While in 
the past public health messages tended to be preached at the audience from 
press releases written by the Department of Health and filtered through 
newspapers, today’s engagement is more of a two-way conversation, in 
which information can flow both ways. The public are active commentators 
and can even drive the traditional media news agenda through social media. 
Just like drug-resistant microbes, media and communication strategies 
constantly adapt and evolve; a story that leads a TV news bulletin one day 
might not even make the running order the next, but conversations on Twitter 
and Facebook, not to mention influential discussion sites such as Mumsnet, 
may still be going strong and may enable the message’s influence to increase 
steadily through viral spread, the digital equivalent of word of mouth. 
Any communications campaign, whether it involves traditional or new media, 
depends on trust and empathy; the message must come from a trusted source, 
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be believable, reliable and verifiable. While social media enables healthcare 
professionals to bypass journalistic filters and biases and talk directly to their 
audience, they need to be sure the audience will take notice. The public 
may be more likely to listen to celebrities than medical or academic experts: 
engaging a celebrity face in any public communication campaign may be the 
difference between its success or failure, as discussed in Discussion Group 
5. Research by Opinion Leader, part of Chime Research and Engagement 
Division published in Marketing Week in May 20091 refers to the modern day 
as the ‘Age of Emotional Proximity’ where peer recommendations surpass all 
other forms of marketing. A Department of Health survey in October 2002 
showed that when the public were asked which source they trusted to give 
facts on MMR, only 7 per cent said a medical spokesperson, while 34 per 
cent said the TV presenters Richard Madeley and Judy Finnigan.
Reliability of Social Media Information
As well as helping to spread the message, social media can also help to 
provide information and data into the healthcare sector by crowd-sourcing 
information. An excellent example of how this has been used to good effect 
is Google flu trends, which uses aggregated Google search data to estimate 
current flu activity around the world in near-real time2 by working on the 
assumption that an increase in the number of people searching for flu-
related information suggests an increase in cases of flu. While the absolute 
accuracy of information obtained through Google flu maps is questionable, 
the tool does have value in showing which areas are, in general, more likely 
to be affected than others.
Concerns that crowd-sourced information may be inaccurate due to the 
public maliciously or mistakenly feeding in false information appear to be 
largely unfounded; where false information is posted it tends to be taken 
down just as quickly. For example, false information posted during bushfires 
in Australia and during the 2012 summer riots in the UK was countered very 
quickly by other posters.3 The public self-censor social media sites and this 
can be used to good effect to spread valid information and also to counter 
rumours and negative information put out through other mainstream or 
social media channels.
There are a number of free tools available to analyse social media. Twitter 
shows what subjects are ‘trending’ by counting the number of times certain 
words are used in messages and some sites will also translate text data into 
visual forms so that popular subjects can be spotted easily. Others sites sift 
and monitor social media to turn information into intelligence. Aggregators 
1  J Roberts, ‘How deference became reference’, Marketing Week, 13 May 2009.
2  See < http://www.google.org/flutrends/>, last accessed 20 May 2013.
3  See <http://www.dontpaniccorrectingmythsaboutthecrowd.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/
riots–not–incited–by–twitter–shock.html>, last accessed 20 May 2013.
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like Addict-o-matic can search for a subject such as AMR and display what 
people are saying about it on various platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube and Flickr, as well as in traditional newspapers, radio and TV. Tools 
such as these can be used to find conversations on Twitter and Facebook and 
will enable professionals to join in, and can potentially provide near real-
time feedback and qualitative information from the public.
Language Issues
With any planned public information campaign, there will be a need to be 
aware of language and literacy barriers within some demographic groups. This 
can be a particular issue with AMR as in some of the immigrant populations 
in the UK that are known to have high rates of tuberculosis and gonorrhoea, 
for example, illiteracy is as high as 80 per cent. This can be due to a strong 
culture of oral tradition rather than a lack of access to education, so providing 
translated written information may not help. There is, however, no indication 
that is significantly more of a challenge in AMR than in other areas of healthcare, 
though the difficulty of communicating information on gonorrhoea to a woman 
who may be using her young child as a translator was noted.
Research Topic Suggestions
There were no specific research topics suggested by this group.
Discussion Group 3: Improving Diagnostic 
Techniques
Chair: Professor Jodi Lindsay
Rapporteur: Mark Gould
Key Issues and Challenges
• More research is needed into biomarkers that can indicate quickly 
whether a bacterial infection that will respond to therapy is present 
• Rapid (point of care) diagnostic tests that can quickly distinguish 
between bacterial and viral infection would be valuable.
A significant challenge to tackling antibiotic resistance is reducing the overuse 
of antibiotics. This includes reducing the quantity of antibiotics prescribed 
and improving the quality of antibiotic prescribing so that narrow-spectrum 
drugs are used to target specific infections. Both of these approaches depend 
on rapid, accurate point-of-care diagnosis that, ideally, can give instant results 
at the hospital bedside or the GP’s surgery, or at the border for immigration 
screening. In particular, rapid diagnostic tools are needed that can help to 
bring down the number of times antibiotics are prescribed to patients who 
have no infection at all, or who have a viral infection on which antibiotics will 
have no effect.
At present, accurate diagnosis for infection can take days, weeks, or even 
months to confirm whether infection is present at all and whether the 
infection is bacterial or viral. During this time, patients may be prescribed 
antibiotics as a precaution, until the presence of infection is ruled out. This 
course of action has relatively few side effects for the individual patient but 
such extensive use of antibiotics increases the likelihood and prevalence 
of resistant strains developing and therefore has a detrimental effect on 
community and future population health. It is also important to remember 
‘relatively few’ side effects does not mean none; approximately one in every 
hundred people has an adverse reaction of some kind to antibiotics, and 
approximately one in every 10,000 has a true allergic reaction; the latter can 
prove fatal. Antibiotics have been linked to inner-ear damage and increased 
risks of childhood obesity and asthma. There is increasing evidence that 
harmless bacteria in the human body that play a key role in controlling 
infection susceptibility, autoimmunity, obesity and brain function are heavily 
altered by antibiotic prescribing.
Rapid diagnostic techniques that are able to quickly identify whether infection 
is present and what particular infection is present would help to reduce this 
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precautionary prescribing by increasing the certainty that an infection is or is 
not present at an earlier stage in the treatment cycle. 
Current Challenges to (Rapid) Diagnosis
At present, bacterial infection is largely determined or ruled out through 
a combination of direct observation of signs and symptoms indicative of 
infection by a medical professional (which includes, but is not limited to, high 
body temperature, fever, rash, fatigue, general aches and pains and nausea); 
the recently published NICE Guideline 1491 lists a number of biomarkers that 
are considered to be risk factors or clinical indicators of neonatal infection, 
for example. The presence of directly observed biomarkers is often then 
followed by a blood, urine or sputum sample (plus spinal fluid in the case 
of brain infection) that is taken from the patient and cultured (grown) in a 
microbiology laboratory to both confirm the presence of bacterial infection 
and to identify the specific pathogen responsible.
It can take two to three days for the bacteria to actually culture to the stage 
where the specific bacterium can be determined; add to this the time to 
deliver the fluid sample to the laboratory and for results to be returned, 
if the laboratory is not on-site at the healthcare facility where the patient 
is being treated (the loss of on-site hospital microbiology laboratories to 
more centralised facilities is seen as a particular challenge). In addition, over 
a further two-to-three days, small amounts of antibiotics may be applied 
to the culture to determine which might be the most effective in treating 
the infection (a process known as determining antibiotic sensitivity).2 In 
some cases, the time between the fluid sample being taken and a positive 
culture growth obtained can be much longer than a few days – for instance, a 
positive result for tuberculosis can take up to three months to yield a result,3 
which poses particular challenges for infection control at immigration and 
border control points.
The main disadvantages of results taking at least two-to-three days to 
obtain is that during this time, the patient will often be given antibiotics 
as a precautionary measure until bacterial infection is ruled out. This may 
require the patient to remain in hospital, particularly if the antibiotics 
need to be administered intravenously, when they do not in fact have an 
infection and could be managed elsewhere, for instance in the community. 
An added complication is the collateral damage associated with misuse of 
antibiotics; particularly with regard to colonisation and/or infection with 
super bugs like MRSA, C difficile and other healthcare acquired infections. 
1 See: <guidance.nice.org.uk/CG149>, last accessed 22 August 2012.
2 Basic introductions to bacterial culture tests can be found at: <http://healthengine.
com.au/info/Bacterial_Culture_Test>.
3 See <www.who.int/tb/features_archive/new_rapid_test/en/>, last accessed 8 August 
2012.
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Intravenous administration of antibiotics in particular, brings with it a risk of 
healthcare acquired infections due to cannulas becoming infected. A further 
consideration is the financial burden on the NHS. 
Not administering antibiotics immediately on suspicion of infection, however, 
may result in the patient’s condition worsening, and, in extreme cases, may 
be fatal.
The risks to the patient of withholding antibiotics until an accurate 
diagnosis has been made have to be weighed against the risks to the patient 
associated with administering antibiotics that are not needed and the risks 
to the community and population of increasing AMR. The solution to these 
challenges is to provide accurate diagnosis more quickly, so that decisions to 
begin or stop antibiotics can be made as quickly as possible – preferably at 
the hospital bedside or at the GPs surgery and, in the case of immigration 
control, at the point of departure from or arrival at international borders. In 
particular, doctors would like to have a way to determine quickly whether an 
infection is bacterial rather than viral. Such tests have to be simple but also 
sensitive and accurate, and need to give answers in minutes, similar to the 
way in which pregnancy tests give very quick results. 
A key question for the discussion forum was the scientific, technological 
and economic feasibility of developing a test that could enable such a rapid 
but accurate diagnosis. Ideally, it would be able to be administered by non-
specialists with limited training and would not need to be sent away to 
a lab (though samples may be sent to a lab for further analysis). To what 
extent specialists – such as specialist sepsis diagnosticians – would need to 
be included in any such process was also discussed, as was where the test 
should be taken (for example, identifying sepsis in accident and emergency 
patients).
To add an additional challenge, an increasing use of, and push towards 
increasing use of, narrow-spectrum drugs increases the requirement for 
rapid, accurate diagnosis. In the words of one doctor: ‘if narrow-spectrum 
drugs are being developed that only treat, for example, C. difficile, you’ve 
really got to know what you are treating or it won’t work’.
There are a number of options that increase the speed and accuracy of 
diagnosis and much research and development work is already being funded 
and carried out in this area. For example, the Home Office’s Office of Security 
and Counter Terrorism ran a conference on this specific topic in June 2013 at 
the Royal Society in London.
Droplets of fluid samples taken at the bedside might be transferred to a 
glass slide or other device for immediate microscopy analysis; ideally, this 
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would be conducted on a simple-to-operate, handheld device that would 
automatically identify likely pathogens in the sample and would require 
minimal microbiology to determine and understand results. This could help 
to make immediate decisions on whether antibiotics should be prescribed 
or not. 
In this case, diagnostic techniques that are able to identify positive culture 
growths incrementally would also be advantageous; for example, such 
a test might initially identifying broad groupings, such as Gram-negative 
bacilli, or Gram-positive cocci, with further analysis then narrowing down to 
identification of the specific pathogen, such as E coli or S aureus. This may 
help to target specific antibiotics, and enable a switch from broad-spectrum 
to narrow(er)-spectrum drugs to happen more quickly. 
The use of molecular assays in particular was mentioned as a new area of 
research that is improving the current situation4 and can overcome some of 
the limitations of microscopy and delays due to growing cultures of infectious 
organisms. Molecular tests for specific pathogens and resistant variants are 
already on the market for specific applications. The current limitation is that 
they are generally only able to detect one or two markers, and therefore 
provide only a Yes or No answer to the presence of specific pathogens.
It is important to remember, however, that detecting ‘something’ is present 
so that a further test can determine what that ‘something’ is, may not 
necessarily be helpful, as the ‘something’ may not be of clinical importance.
Future Options
Sequencing
All living organisms have a genome that dictates the function of that organism. 
Humans are covered in bacteria, fungi and viruses that may or may not cause 
disease, and patient specimens may contain a wide variety of genomes 
that can be universally identified using sequencing technologies. The first 
human genome was sequenced in 1997, but already thousands of human 
genomes and millions of pathogen genomes have been sequenced using 
faster, cheaper and more flexible next-generation sequencing platforms. 
Diagnostics based on sequencing will centre on identification of sequence 
markers associated with clinical infection and response to interventions such 
as specific antibiotics. Sequencing studies are also likely to identify cheaper 
and faster specific molecular tests for certain clinical scenarios.
4 E M Burd, ‘Validation of Laboratory–Developed Molecular Assays for Infectious 
Disease’, Clinical Microbiology Reviews (Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2010) pp. 550–576. See 
<http://cmr.asm.org/content/23/3/550.full>, last accessed 24 April 2013.
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Sequencing is one way by which diagnosis may be speeded up as well as 
being able to test for a wide range of pathogens and resistance markers at 
the same time. Developing this technology will include identifying known 
and novel sequence biomarkers that are associated with clinical importance 
and response to interventions. 
The technology currently available is not yet sufficiently advanced to be 
available to the clinician at the bedside; the sequencing would have to be 
carried in a laboratory. In addition, sequencing is not yet sufficiently speedy 
and responsive to provide more rapid diagnosis than the currently used 
tests. While costs are falling, they are still too high for universal NHS use. It is 
likely to be another ten to twenty years before sequencing will be at a stage 
where a mainstream application is feasible.
Nonetheless, sequencing has the potential to speed up current diagnosis as 
culturing may not be necessary, or the bacteria may be able to be sequenced 
much earlier on during the culturing process.
Biomarkers
A biomarker, or biological marker, is a biological indicator or characteristic that 
can be measured or evaluated to provide information on a biological state. 
For example, the presence of an antibody in a blood sample may indicate 
infection; raised temperature may also indicate infection. During both this 
conference and the conference held the previous day, on Pharmaceutical 
Resilience,5 there was considerable discussion about whether a challenge in 
modern research and technology is that we focus too heavily on refining the 
measurement of biomarkers we have always used to determine infection 
(for example, developing digital thermometers rather than mercury 
thermometers, or developing ways to increase the speed of culture growth) 
rather than researching completely different biomarkers that might be 
more accurate indicators of infection. Suggestions given might be changes 
in skin colour or sweat production that are imperceptible to human senses 
but which could be monitored electronically, rather than body temperature. 
Could research into potential alternative biomarkers provide more accurate 
and timely diagnosis and, if so, what might these alternative biomarkers be?
Next-generation sequencing and molecular techniques are currently in 
development and/or may be developed in the future to identify host factors 
associated with infection. These may be extremely useful in identifying 
the biomarkers that might turn into useful point-of-care diagnostics. It is 
important to acknowledge that there will be a number of different situations 
in which biomarkers may need to be measured, each requiring different 
diagnostic requirements, different samples and different outcomes, so 
there are likely to be a number of solutions rather than just one. Choosing 
5 ‘Pharmaceutical Resilience’, RUSI workshop report, 5 February 2013.
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appropriate biomarkers might also involve developing ways to better identify 
which people do not need to be treated as well as those who do, or those on 
whom treatment might not work. 
Research Topic Suggestions
1. Develop a set of biomarkers for elective surgery patients to tell which 
patient might have a bacterium and who might also be resistant. 
This may be too broad a remit for a small project, but an initial step 
could be to consider what methodology might be used and which 
biomarkers should be considered.
2. Determine whether point of care tests such as for procalcitonin (from 
a blood drop or urine) can determine the presence or absence of 
bacterial infection. A secondary question would be: could this test 
help in reducing unnecessary antibiotics? Ideally the test should be 
like a pregnancy test, which can be used in any clinic or GP practice in 
the UK or abroad (and even potentially at home by the patient) and 
should not be more expensive than the cost of the antibiotics. 
3. Develop a rapid point-of-care diagnostic tool for neonatal infections. 
This would need to detect up to six pathogens in a very small volume 
of blood.
4. Develop a rapid point-of-care system to detect for suspected severe 
sepsis in order to narrow the specific diagnosis. The object of this 
would be to decrease the overall prescribing of antibiotics. Any rapid 
point-of-care system would need to detect sepsis across all main 
infectious bacterium. A useful test may only need to focus on the 
main infectious bacteria that respond to therapy. There are a range of 
platforms that could be considered.
Further Reading
S Banoo et al, ‘Evaluation of diagnostic tests for infectious diseases: general 
principles’, Nature Reviews Microbiology (S16-S28). See <http://www.nature.
com/nrmicro/journal/v8/n12_supp/full/nrmicro1523.html>.
Group 4: Data Collection and Sharing
Chair: Ashley Truluck CBE
Rapporteur: Philippa Morrell
Key Issues and Challenges
• There are currently no defined standards for the collection of data 
that may be of use to AMR research and therefore no consistency to 
the way data is collected
• There is a poor understanding of what data is already available, who 
owns it and how it might be used; consequently, there is also no clear 
understanding of what additional data is needed
• Addressing the two points above will help to determine future data-
collection requirements.
Good data and good data sets provide an evidence base that can be used 
to understand and analyse the current situation; predict and model future 
scenarios; determine the efficiency of current and suggested new practices; 
inform policy decisions; and help in the development of new clinical 
practices and guidelines. At present, however, while there is undoubtedly a 
wealth of data available which may be of use in tackling AMR, this is neither 
well-catalogued nor available in formats that can be easily interrogated, 
amalgamated or analysed. 
There is no systematic collection of data on the criteria against which patients 
are given which antibiotics, and whether some patients, or demographics, 
respond differently to different antibiotics. The information that is collected 
is neither readily available nor systematically shared, even though this may 
help to change how prescribing decisions are made and how antibiotics are 
prescribed in future. 
There is no clear picture of who is collecting and reporting data that might be 
of use to AMR researchers, nor of what further data collection may be needed. 
The WHO collects significant amounts of data on related topics, and holds 
significant data sets including feedback on former outbreaks, information 
from Centres of Excellence on diseases, and information from disaster relief 
operations, but this is neither easily usable by other researches nor easy to 
incorporate into other studies; some of the information is also classified. The 
majority of the relevant information is probably already available; the issue 
is where to find it and how to use it, as well as who owns it and what can 
legally be done with it under (real or imagined) data protection constraints.
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The Importance of Standards
A further complicating issue is that there is little standardisation to the way in 
which data that may be relevant to AMR is collected, stored and shared. For 
example, while a lot of data is collected against the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD)1 diagnostic tool, which is used in WHO member states and 
followed by the NHS and the American Medical Association, there are no 
data standards related to the information.
Standards need to be in place to ensure that data is collected and recorded 
in a consistent way so that sharing and analysis is possible. This includes 
procedural and implementation standards as well as standards for quality, 
format and definitions. If set correctly, such standards will enable data 
sharing across as well as within sectors, for example between the medical 
and veterinary sectors. 
Standards are also very important to how data is stored: one single databank 
holding a vast amount of data might be the ‘perfect world’ solution, but 
a federated network of data banks with consistent standards that enable 
sharing is probably a more realistic aim, particularly as significant amounts 
of data already exist. 
The Strategic Aims of Data Collection
Before embarking on any large-scale data project, it will be important to set 
clear strategic aims, including: what is the data being collected for and does it 
need to be shared; in particular, any potential barriers need to be understood 
before data collection commences. Data protection may differ depending on 
whether the data is being collected by the NHS as part of a patient’s personal 
health record; to inform academic research or government policy formation; 
or by a private-sector pharmaceutical company for commercial purposes.
In the context of AMR, data collection and sharing should aim to enable better 
understanding of the spread of drug-resistant diseases and how resistance 
emerges and increases. In the event of new outbreaks, quick collection, 
sharing and analysis of such data could provide a single operating picture 
that would help to quickly identify outbreak hotspots, aid accurate diagnoses 
and could help understanding of the cause or emergence of resistance. In a 
more academic context, interrogating and analysing existing data can help 
us to understand what has happened in the past so that we can learn from 
experience and plan differently for the future. Data can help to ensure that 
mistakes are not repeated and that best practice is identified and proved.
Existing Data
An audit of what data is already available, what is in the process of being 
collected, and where it is held would benefit researchers hugely; this will help 
1  See <www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/>, last accessed 17 May 2013.
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researchers to decide what can be done with it, and also what information 
is currently missing.
A better understanding of the research that has already been carried out 
and the data already available will help to devise the optimum strategy for 
the use of antibiotics. Optimum strategy should be based on a combination 
of factors including clinical outcome and financial considerations; the latter 
is important as a business case that helps to show how money can be saved 
may help to fund future research. 
Such an approach could, for example, help to measure the impact of current 
strategies, behaviours and programmes. Better diagnostics is very important, 
as narrowed use of antibiotics will help to reduce resistance, but few statistics 
are collected on how accurate a diagnosis was; whether a patient really 
needed the antibiotics that were prescribed to them; and what was the 
cause of the symptoms if a bacterial infection was not present. In addition, 
the doctor doing the prescribing may not always know the full diagnosis; 
more detailed recording of the patient’s case history to that point may help 
to rule out bacterial infection, or to suggest other, more likely causes of the 
symptoms the patient is displaying. 
Summary
There needs to be a strategic audit of all the data available and where it is 
held, including what was the purpose of collecting the data, followed by the 
introduction of standards for collecting and sharing data within a national 
(if not international) framework. This is likely to require a champion at both 
the national and NHS Trust level. It will enable decisions to be made on what 
information still needs to be collected and how currently existing data can 
be shared. Sharing of data should be possible from both the ‘bottom up’ 
and the ‘top down’; clinicians need to be able to share data quickly on local 
outbreaks and resistance, and the WHO needs to facilitate better holding 
and sharing of strategic data. Such data sharing, however, will require the 
development of a comprehensive standard for data collection and data 
reporting. This could be a role for NHS Trusts, but it needs to be carefully 
planned, and data-protection issues need to be taken into account.
Research Topic Suggestions and Further Actions Needed
1. Fund an audit of existing data sets and databases that might be of 
value to research into antimicrobial resistance, including what data 
exists, who owns it, how it has been recorded and how, or if, it can be 
shared.
2. Develop standards for the collection of future data so that it can be 
more easily shared, aggregated and analysed.

Group 5: Barriers to Implementing AMR Strategy
Chair: Dr Jo Wallace
Rapporteur: Benjamin Toomer
Key issues and Challenges
• AMR needs cross-departmental government support
• Some AMR strategies conflict with other health sector policies such 
as the Quality and Outcomes Framework. These need to be de-
conflicted
• Government support is needed to extend GP and hospital 
appointments to allow time for more accurate diagnosis and increased 
patient counselling. Short-term cost implications will be offset by 
long-term benefits
• Tacking AMR needs to be seen as a public good, for which international 
and UK government intervention (and if necessary, funding), is 
essential
• Better information and widespread education would dispel the 
impression that antibiotics are cheap, readily available and harmless, 
and thus help to encourage support for better stewardship.
Political engagement and support for tacking AMR will become increasingly 
necessary as the risk from resilient strains of disease-causing pathogens 
grows larger; AMR being placed upon the National Risk Register, which is 
likely to happen following its current consideration in the National Security 
Risk Assessment, is welcomed and will help to stress the seriousness of the 
situation. 
Tackling AMR still requires substantial cross-government support; in 
particular, the Department of Health, the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra), Business, Industry and Skills (BIS) and the Treasury 
all need to work together. While the Department of Health arguably owns 
the risk and should take the lead in tackling it, addressing the issue from a 
number of perspectives will help to highlight the importance of AMR to all 
sectors of business and society. Cross-governmental collaboration is essential 
for developing situational awareness and sharing information, as well as 
for enabling the real-time monitoring of patient health and movements to 
mitigate risk and to support public awareness campaigns to get the message 
out widely.
NHS Engagement
Across the NHS, the current level of engagement with AMR issues is considered 
to be low, while certain health policies create barriers to tacking AMR. For 
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example, NHS league tables and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
indicators put pressure on GPs to cure patients as quickly as possible, but 
this may be without consideration for the longer-term implications. If policy-
makers better understood the long-term risk AMR poses, they may remove 
current time pressures and give GPs more discretion in the prescription of 
antibiotics.
Government reforms are essential if the number of broad-spectrum antibiotics 
given to patients is to be reduced: giving GPs and hospital staff extra time to 
diagnose illness and therefore giving them more chance of prescribing the 
correct antibiotics, or of diagnosing a viral rather than bacterial infection, 
would be better for the patient and for the wider population even though it 
might cost more in the short-term. Government funding is needed to improve 
patient counselling and to extend appointments so that fewer antibiotics are 
distributed. At present there are insufficient incentives for tackling AMR and 
little questioning of, or penalties for, poor prescribing practice.
European Engagement
At the international level, political support for AMR programmes is relatively 
strong. The EU’s European Antibiotic Awareness Day, held annually on 
18 November1 since 2008, provides a good platform on which to engage 
the issue in the wider political context. The Transatlantic Task Force on 
Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR),2 a joint venture between the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the US Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC), has helped to drive understanding and policy forward. 
European Antibiotic Awareness Day is the perfect platform on which to push 
messages on AMR but it needs to be better utilised in the UK with a number 
of government departments, GPs, hospitals and pharmacies all reinforcing 
the same message. Other international approaches, such as the Innovative 
Medicines Initiative,3 are also helping to drive action forward, although 
AMR is too important an issue to be left dependent on the private sector. 
International and UK governments must be encouraged to see investment in 
tackling AMR as a ‘public good’. 
Should the UK choose to leave the EU in future (or the EU disintegrate entirely), 
separation may lead to reduced cohesion in the approaches to tackling AMR, 
and could mean fewer collaboratively funded research programmes. Any loss 
of free trade between member states might also potentially harm interest 
from multi-national pharmaceutical businesses: given the dependence upon 
the private sector for expertise and manufacturing capability, leaving the EU 
1 See < http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/EAAD/Pages/Home.aspx/>, last accessed 17 May 
2013.
2 See < http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/diseaseprogrammes/tatfar/Pages/
index.aspx?MasterPage=1>, last accessed 17 May 2013.
3 See < http://www.imi.europa.eu/>, last accessed 17 May 2013.
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could have a destabilising effect on the development pipeline. On the other 
hand, restricted immigration may help to isolate the UK population from 
resistant strains that emerge overseas and slow the mutation of bacterial 
infection. 
The Cost of Antibiotics
Financial considerations may prove key to tacking AMR. Members of the 
general public take it for granted that antibiotics are cheap and readily 
accessible even though they have no specific knowledge of the price, or of 
the price comparison with other treatments, such as those for cancer, which 
are perceived as being highly expensive. While antibiotics are relatively 
inexpensive compared to other treatments, they are a cornerstone of 
modern medical practice and inappropriate use threatens to undermine 
this. Better information and widespread education is needed to dispel the 
impression that antibiotics are ‘cheap and easy’; this should be addressed in 
a public awareness campaign and would help to counter any impression that 
reducing the use of antibiotics is a government cost-cutting measure driven 
by austerity.
Such messages may have more impact on the public if they come from 
medical practitioners rather than from politicians or senior government 
officials. In particular, if the reasons for not prescribing drugs were explained 
by GPs at the point of care, patients would understand the benefits to the 
medical industry and public health. By focusing entirely on the scientific 
evidence for growing resistance to conventional drugs, it should be possible 
to avoid any accusations of financial cost saving. 
The Influence of the Media
The coverage of any stories relating to AMR in the media will have a huge 
influence on public attitudes to new government policies and, in turn, to 
those government policies and approaches. Media coverage tends to focus on 
negative stories – such as increased prevalence of ‘superbugs’ and wasteful 
NHS expenditure – whereas more positive stories of medical breakthroughs 
and successes in the curtailment of AMR receive less coverage. In particular, 
there is a danger that the media might latch onto the spread of resistant 
strains through migration and turn AMR into an anti-immigration issue with 
a political dimension, or accuse efforts to reduce the number of antibiotics 
prescribed of being cost-cutting measures that put patient health at risk. 
Journalists are often pressed for time and have to cover a wide range of 
subject matter; they are not AMR specialists and so may not be able to 
fully grasp the subtleties of the subject quickly. Explaining the key points as 
succinctly as possible is key to ensuring information is not misinterpreted, 
as is finding an interesting perspective on AMR that is likely to engage the 
media, and therefore will help the media to engage the audience. There are 
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strong advantages to focusing on the development and supply of information 
in a media-friendly and easily understood format: newspapers do tend to 
respond well to statistics and data. Providing evidence of the long-term cost 
savings of AMR efforts while showing that this has no detrimental effect on 
patient outcome, or encouraging newspapers to run stories showing how one 
demographic (or region) is reducing local use of antibiotics more successfully 
than another, to encourage others to try harder, could be useful approaches. 
Regional league tables of some kind might help with such an approach.
The role of the media is further explored in Discussion Group 2.
Public Motivation
Public pressure has a huge role to play: a key challenge is how to educate 
the public and engage them in the debate so that they will lobby their MPs 
to take action. Educating the public about AMR will also encourage them to 
question why GPs and other medical professionals are prescribing antibiotics 
as opposed to why they are not. 
Encouraging patients to take more responsibility for their own care and long-
term health is an important part of any AMR message. Handing out leaflets at 
the point of care would be a good way to educate people on the reasons why 
their doctor might have chosen not to give them medicines they expected 
to receive. 
Inviting experts in the field of AMR to appear on current affairs programmes 
such as Today and Newsnight would also serve to increase awareness of the 
issue. The format of these shows allows important issues to be explored in 
more depth, helping to both press and reinforce the message. As such shows 
have a regular audience, it would also help the message to reach people who 
are not actively seeking information on AMR but who might, nonetheless, 
take action. 
Existing recognisable and reputable celebrities are ideal candidates to 
champion AMR strategies and to encourage the public to take on the cause 
for themselves. Celebrities such as Stephen Fry can be hugely influential 
and the recent association of Bill Bailey with Prostate Cancer UK shows 
how celebrities can help to highlight medical and health causes. Similarly, 
exploiting the already large audience of ongoing TV soaps such as Eastenders 
and Coronation Street by inserting a storyline around the theme of AMR 
would also be good exposure.
Emulating the success of the ‘Catch it, Bin it, Kill it’ campaign used during 
the swine flu pandemic was described as being a good target for AMR 
awareness. Strategies for engaging the public in getting the message out are 
further discussed in Group 2.
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Suggested Research Topics
1. Develop strategies that focus on the scientific evidence for growing 
resistance to conventional drugs and which highlight the long-term 
harm this will cause. This will make it clear that any drive to reduce 
the use of antibiotics is not just a cost-saving measure.
2. Develop and supply data and statistics on AMR in a media-friendly and 
easily understood format, so that this can be used to raise awareness 
and highlight success and cannot be misinterpreted.
3. Fund short studies into comparing the long-term benefits with the 
short-term cost increase of extending GP and hospital appointments 
to improve diagnosis and increase patient counselling so that fewer 
antibiotics are distributed. 

Conclusions and Summary

Research Themes Identified
Chapter I: Professor Dame Sally Davies
A multi-pronged holistic approach is needed: there is urgent need for action 
at a global level to facilitate antibiotic development. 
Surveillance activities and practices need to change to ensure that information 
on travel and hospitalisation abroad is captured on admission to the UK or to 
the NHS. Screening, isolation and enhanced infection control measures need 
to be introduced, as appropriate, to reduce transmission. 
Chapter II: Dr Charles R Penn
Research is needed that takes an overview of the numerous infection-
tracking systems in place across the world to provide a better global picture, 
in terms of the microbiological impact, the health impact and the economic 
impact of AMR, and the interaction between them. 
Chapter III: Professor Alan Johnson
Research is needed into why certain strains of bacteria are better at spreading 
than others. If the underlying mechanisms were better understood, it might 
be easier to develop possible interventions at local, national and international 
levels, and to determine which interventions are likely to be most effective.
A second important area for research is whether plasmid spread can be 
prevented. With the genes encoding resistance spreading between different 
types of bacteria, a whole new magnitude of difficulty is being faced. 
Thirdly, since a lot of gene transfer is believed to take place in the gut, 
researchers could look at antibiotic resistance in gut bacteria and how this 
affects resistance in general. 
Chapter IV: Dr Hayley Wickens 
Gaps are present in the evidence base. An example of this is that when a 
doctor asks for evidence that a patient can successfully switch from IV to 
oral antibiotics after forty-eight hours with no adverse effects, the evidence 
is often not there. Research is needed to plug such gaps.
More information is needed on whether infections are bacterial or not. 
Rapid diagnostics can contribute to this, but so too can looking at what 
combination of signs, symptoms and objective data can be used to determine 
the likelihood or certainty of (clinically relevant) bacterial infection. 
Good epidemiological data is needed on community pathogens; what is 
submitted through hospital laboratories misses what is causing the majority 
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of UTIs, for example, as specimens are not sent for routine, run-of-the-mill 
cases.
There is a lack of evidence on de-escalation of antibiotics, especially de-
escalation from IV to oral drugs. Patients need to be more aggressively 
switched while they are still recovering, so that evidence can be built up 
on what works, and what if any risks are associated with it. At the moment, 
good data on this is not available.
The evidence that prolonged courses are associated with more positive 
effects is not well established. There are no studies that show that ten 
days of augmentin for a community-acquired pneumonia will give worse 
outcomes than five, for example. This type of data is needed, along with 
more information on clinical outcomes on optimal course lengths and early 
discontinuation.
Chapter V: Dr Jim Gray
Improved testing at point of care and the development of new diagnostic 
strategies that are not dependent on overnight incubation for results 
offer real potential to better target antibiotic therapy towards only those 
patients who need it. Investigation into antibiotic treatment decision-making 
based on emerging miniaturised molecular diagnostic tests would also be 
advantageous.
Clearer clinical guidance is needed, backed up with evidence, on when it is 
safe to withhold antibiotics.
In August 2012, NICE Guideline 149 was published. In developing the 
guidance, the Guideline Development Group was regularly constrained 
by the limited amount of good-quality published evidence on all aspects 
of antibiotic treatment of neonatal infections. Greater involvement of 
microbiology services in providing accurate data on the causes of true 
infection may therefore be helpful in promoting good antibiotic stewardship 
in neonates.
For neonates who remain on antibiotic therapy for confirmed or suspected 
systemic sepsis, the Guideline Development Group found an absence 
of clinical trial data on which to base recommendations on duration of 
treatment; more research is needed. 
Chapter VI: Dr Andreas Schätzlein
Understanding how heterogeneous populations fit into their ‘biotope’ and 
co-develop may become increasingly important as a way to develop new 
ways for treating diseases which can constantly evolve in response to a 
changing environment.
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It may be important not only to think about the patients, but also about 
their wider environment as a biotope – as an ecosystem that needs to be 
considered in terms of how it works together, in order to understand how 
pathological infections can be limited.
Chapter VII: Professor Mike Sharland
Current knowledge of even the basic epidemiology of multi-resistant bacteria 
is limited. 
Gaps include the duration of carriage of resistant organisms within the human 
intestine; the relation between carriage and invasive disease; whether 
specific high-risk groups or individuals exist; and whether and how these 
might be targeted for screening to minimise the potential for transmission. 
Research is also needed to determine how, if screening is to be undertaken 
as part of an infection prevention and control process, it can be undertaken 
optimally. How effective is isolation and is decolonisation a feasible option? 
What is the cost effectiveness of the numerous potential interventions?
Chapter VIII: Group Captain A D Green
As AMR increases, the treatment of casualties on the battlefield will become 
more complex, both for trauma and infectious diseases as AMR increases; 
how this can be managed needs to be researched.
More research is needed into how military patients return multi-resistant 
organisms from overseas to their homeland. 
The increased use of multinational forces to provide humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief means that they in turn might export novel bacteria to 
receptive environments and ways to ensure this does not happen need to be 
better understood.
Chapter IX: Chris Watkins and Jennifer Cole
Research needs to be done on preparedness planning using digital 
communications technologies for real-time epidemiology, automatic contact 
tracing and providing personalised estimates of infection risk, as well as for 
promoting efficient public discussion and for enabling local co-ordination of 
volunteers. 
Research is also needed to smooth the technical, ethical, practical and legal 
problems that will inevitably arise from collecting, storing and sharing large 
amounts of patient or population data. 
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Discussion Group 1: Changing Behaviour in Antibiotic Prescribing
In light of the new NICE Guideline 149 on Neonatal Infection, which is intended 
to reduce the unnecessary administration of antibiotics to neonates, short 
monitoring pilot projects in one or more hospital are required over the next 
12 months to record information on the cases where previously antibiotics 
might have been administered but withholding them is now recommended, to 
record whether there was any adverse outcome associated with withholding 
them, what (if any) this was, and what was the actual cause of the Clinical 
Indicator or Risk Factor listed in the NICE Guideline. 
Short studies that gather and analyse statistics relating to the likelihood of 
outcomes, and severity of outcomes, would help to build confidence in new 
behaviours; in particular, it would help to know the percentage of patients 
displaying particular clinical indicators in whom infection was confirmed, and 
if there is likely to be any adverse outcome to the patient associated with 
delaying antibiotic treatment until infection is more certain or confirmed.
A study is needed to determine the link between neonates born following 
maternal hyperthermia in labour (where the hyperthermia might be 
consequence of vasodilation secondary to epidural analgesics rather than 
infection) and the administration of antibiotics on suspicion of infection.
A systematic review of past public health campaigns needs to be conducted 
to suggest what messages, and which delivery methods, may best inform an 
AMR awareness campaign and campaigns to reduce the use of antibiotics. 
Discussion Group 2: Communicating the AMR Message
No specific research themes were suggested by this discussion group
Discussion Group 3: Improving Diagnostic Techniques
A set of biomarkers for elective surgery patients needs to be developed, to 
tell which patient might have a bacterium and who might also be resistant. 
This may be too broad a remit for a small project, but an initial step could be 
to consider what methodology might be used and which biomarkers should 
be considered.
Determine whether point of care tests such as for procalcitonin (from a 
blood drop or urine) can determine the presence or absence of bacterial 
infection. A secondary question would be whether this test could help in 
reducing unnecessary antibiotics. Ideally, the test should be like a pregnancy 
test, which can be used in any clinic or GP practice in the UK or abroad (and 
even potentially at home by the patient) and should not be more expensive 
than the cost of the antibiotics. 
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Develop a rapid point-of-care diagnostic tool for neonatal infections. This 
would need to detect up to six pathogens in a very small volume of blood.
Develop a rapid point of care system to detect for suspected severe sepsis 
in order to narrow the specific diagnosis. The object of this would be to 
decrease the overall prescribing of antibiotics. Any rapid point of care system 
would need to detect sepsis across all main infectious bacterium.
Discussion Group 4: Data Collection and Sharing
An audit is needed of existing data sets and databases that might be of value 
to research into antimicrobial resistance, including what data sets exist, who 
owns them, how they have been recorded and how, or if, they can be shared.
Standards need to be developed for the collection of future data to enable 
the data available to be more easily shared.
Discussion Group 5: Barriers to Implementing AMR Strategy
Strategies need to be researched that focus on the scientific evidence for 
growing resistance to conventional drugs and which highlight the long-
term harm this will cause, so it is clear that any drive to reduce the use of 
antibiotics is not just a cost-saving measure.
Data and statistics on AMR need to be developed and disseminated in a 
media-friendly and easily understood format, so that they can be used to 
raise awareness and highlight success and cannot be misinterpreted.
Funding is needed for short studies that can compare the long-term benefits 
of extending GP and hospital appointments to improve diagnosis and 
increase patient counselling so that fewer antibiotics are distributed, with 
the short-term cost implications.
